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1 Introduction
Global value chains (GVCs) have fundamentally transformed international trade and development in
recent decades (Baldwin 2016, Antràs 2019, World Development Report 2020). For individual firms,
new challenges and opportunities have arisen as production has fragmented across firm boundaries
and country borders. For aggregate economies, new policy questions have taken center stage: How
do GVCs affect firm performance in the short run and growth prospects in the long term? If global
production lines enable firms in advanced economies to profitably offshore, do they also engender
cross-border technology transfer and structural transformation in less developed countries, or do they
instead entrench such countries in low-profitability, low-growth GVC activities? Despite great policy
interest, only recently has academic research begun to overcome data and conceptual challenges to
dispel common speculation and uncertainty around these issues.
In this paper, we take first steps towards documenting how firms position themselves in GVCs and
how this position evolves with productivity and performance over the firm lifecycle, using matched
firm-level customs and manufacturing survey data for China. China provides a fascinating context
in which to study the implications of global production sharing for firm and aggregate growth.
As the fastest growing economy over the last 30 years, China recently became the second largest
country by GDP and the biggest exporter in the world. Key to this economic transformation has
been its dramatic globalization, marked by its joining the WTO in 2001 (Feenstra and Wei 2010).1
Indeed, various trade and industrial policies have encouraged firms’ participation in GVCs, such as
the formalization of a processing trade regime under which foreign inputs can be imported duty-free
for further processing, assembly and re-exporting (Manova and Yu 2016), or the establishment of
special economic zones that concentrate trade and FDI activity.
Our first contribution is to characterize Chinese firms’ position in GVCs and trace its evolution
over the 1992-2014 period. We exploit detailed Input-Output Tables for China to build an industry-
level measure of upstreamness for 135 industries. Introduced by Fally (2012) and Antràs et al.
(2012), this measure captures an industry’s distance to final demand in terms of the weighted average
number of stages at which the industry is used as a production input before it reaches final uses
(i.e., consumption or investment). Higher values are associated with more upstream sectors (e.g.,
rubber), and lower values indicate sectors that are more proximate to final demand (e.g., cars).
We quantify Chinese firms’ global production line position by combining this industry measure
of upstreamness with detailed information on the product composition of firms’ trade flows. This
allows us to construct weighted-average upstreamness measures of a firm’s imports, UM , and of its
exports, UX . The difference between the two, UM−UX , is thus informative of the span of production
stages that the firm undertakes within China, either by directly performing these or by outsourcing
to other suppliers in China. The Chinese customs data permit us to construct these measures at
1Brandt et al. (2008) quantify the contribution of two other sources of structural transformation to China’s phe-
nomenal growth over 1978-2004: large-scale reallocations from agriculture towards manufacturing and services, and
from state-owned enterprises towards private firms. At the same time, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) conclude that there
is still extensive misallocation of productive resources across Chinese firms compared to the US.
1
the firm level for 2000-2014. We are further able to draw on province- or city-level customs data for
earlier years, to analyze trends in the upstreamness of China’s aggregate trade flows for the more
extended period of 1992-2014.
We identify five Macro Trends in China’s GVC participation. First, over 1992-2014, Chinese
imports became significantly more upstream, while Chinese exports became slightly more proxi-
mate to final demand. Of note, these trends tapered off after 2008, coinciding with when China’s
trade-to-GDP ratio reached its peak and started to moderate (IMF 2016, Frankel 2016). Second,
these developments were mainly driven by ordinary trade, rather than by flows administered un-
der processing and other trade regimes. Third, import and export upstreamness evolved similarly
for all firm ownership types. Though there appear to be persistent level differences – with state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) operating more upstream than private domestic firms, joint ventures, or
foreign-owned affiliates – this gap is due in large part to SOE imports of upstream mineral products.
Fourth, using a formal decomposition, we show that the rise in aggregate import upstreamness
between 2000-2014 is explained by both the net entry of firms that tend to import further upstream
(the extensive margin) and by within-firm increases in import upstreamness (on the intensive mar-
gin). Fifth, we exploit regressions with firm and year fixed effects to confirm that within firms over
time, imports became significantly more upstream, exports became moderately more proximate to
final demand, and the implied span of production stages performed in China increased quickly during
2000-2014.
Our second contribution is to establish new stylized facts about the relationship between Chinese
firms’ attributes, production line position, operations, and performance over the firm lifecycle. We
document four Firm Facts about the evolution in activity within firms over time. First, when firms
become more productive, bigger or more experienced, they import significantly more upstream,
export moderately closer to final demand, and span more production stages in China. These results
hold across different measures of firm productivity (real value added per worker, revenue-based
TFP estimates à la Olley-Pakes, Levinsohn-Petrin, or Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer), firm size (sales,
employment), and firm experience (age, cumulative past trade activity).
Second, when firms span more production stages (in China), they increase their value added in
production, total purchases of material inputs, and use of labor inputs (as captured by the total
wagebill), all proportionately with output. Third, when Chinese firms perform more production
steps, they also raise their fixed costs and assets (proxied respectively by inventory holdings and by
net plant, property and equipment), both in levels and as a share of total book-value assets. Lastly,
when firms expand their production stages, they earn higher profits, although profit margins – in
terms of profit-to-sales, profit-to-value-added, or profit-to-assets ratios – remain largely unchanged.
We establish these four Firm Facts with a baseline specification that controls not only for firm
fixed effects, but also for sector-by-year fixed effects that absorb any common supply and demand
shocks at the industry level. We have found these patterns to be robust under extensive sensitivity
checks. The results hold whether or not we further condition on firm-level measures of skill intensity
(average wage), capital intensity (net fixed assets per worker), or the share of processing trade. The
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Firm Facts pertaining to the span of production stages, UM−UX , hold also when we control directly
for the upstreamness of the firm’s exports, UX , to capture where along global production chains the
firm is positioned relative to final demand. We have also obtained similar patterns with alternative
constructions of the firm-level upstreamness measures, such as when we drop imports and exports
of non-manufacturing products, or of mineral products more specifically.
Our third contribution is to develop a partial-equilibrium model of a firm’s decision over where
to operate along the production chain and which production stages to perform in order to maximize
its profits. Our goal is to provide a baseline conceptual framework that can rationalize the Firm
Facts in the data and highlight key economic mechanisms at play, rather than to fully characterize
firm interactions, price-setting and market-clearing in general equilibrium.
In the model, price-taking firms purchase intermediate inputs from upstream suppliers, add
value in processing these into more complete products along a sequential production line, and sell
their output in competitive markets. Each firm faces decisions on how upstream (or unfinished) an
intermediate input to purchase, and on how proximate to final demand (or finished) an output to
produce; these in turn determine the firm’s span of production stages. Looking upstream, firms face
a trade-off between sourcing a more fully processed but more expensive input and incurring the fixed
and variables costs of performing the inframarginal production steps. Looking downstream, firms
likewise weigh the benefit of selling a more finished output at a higher market price against the fixed
and variable costs of undertaking more production stages. We show that when these inframarginal
fixed and variables costs are relatively small, the model implies a complementarity between the
scale of a firm’s production and the scope of stages it performs: an exogenous positive shock to
productivity would induce the firm to both span more production stages and operate on a bigger
scale, ultimately earning higher profits.
Through the lens of this stylized model, we interpret our first Firm Fact as consistent with
a causal effect of changes in a firm’s productivity on its optimal production line position. This
interpretation extends to the findings for firm size and experience, to the extent that more productive
firms have higher survival probability and changes in firm size arise from underlying shifts in firm
productivity. In line with this causal interpretation, we report additional empirical results based
on an instrumental variable approach: We adopt an IV for firm productivity or for firm size that
captures how exposed Chinese firms are to plausibly exogenous shocks to foreign demand.2 On the
other hand, we view our second to fourth Firm Facts as correlations among joint outcomes of the
firm’s profit maximization problem that reflect optimal operational decisions and resulting profits.
Our findings shed light on policy questions about the implications of GVCs for firm growth, and
challenge concerns about GVC-induced stagnation traps. The new evidence we uncover suggests
that the fragmentation of production across countries can enable firms to first specialize in narrower
segments of GVCs and gradually expand into more production stages, grow their production scale,
add more value, and earn higher profits. While we do not explicitly incorporate this consideration
2We have also implemented an alternative IV based on each Chinese firm’s exposure on the import side to rest-of-
the-world trade shocks. This builds off the idea that increased access to imported inputs can raise firm productivity.
The results obtained are very similar; see Section 4.2.2.
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in our model, this growth path may be especially important in emerging economies where less
productive and less experienced firms stand to gain more from knowledge transfer from foreign buyers
and suppliers. Credit constrained firms may likewise be able to start by operating fewer production
stages, in order to accumulate retained earnings and use internal capital to fund subsequent expansion
along the supply chain. The firm lifecycle facts we have uncovered in a world with GVCs therefore
point to potential macro-level implications that future work can explore.3
Our work contributes to several strands of research. We extend a growing literature in interna-
tional trade on the rise of GVCs. Early empirical analyses have aimed to infer the country origins of
value added embedded in country-level trade flows, and documented the increased fragmentation of
production across borders (e.g., Hummels et al. 2001, Yi 2003, Johnson and Noguera 2012, Koopman
et al. 2014). Much subsequent work has emphasized the important role of international supply chain
linkages for firm operations. Successful exporters routinely use a large share of imported inputs
in producing for foreign markets (e.g., Bernard et al. 2012). This is especially true in developing
economies, where the range, cost and quality of domestic intermediates may be ill-suited to manu-
facturing products that meet the quality standards of foreign consumers and the technological needs
of foreign downstream producers (e.g., Kugler and Verhoogen 2009, 2012, Bas and Strauss-Kahn
2015). Indeed, more than half of Chinese exports are conducted under processing trade, and the
large majority of Chinese exporters intensively use imported inputs (e.g., Manova and Zhang 2012,
Wang and Yu 2012, Manova and Yu 2017).
We specifically advance recent work on global production lines, in which the production process is
viewed as a technologically sequenced series of stages. We provide one of the first firm-level analyses
and document novel stylized facts that speak to the relatively small body of existing models in this
literature. At the aggregate level, Costinot et al. (2013) examine how cross-country productivity
differences affect the span of stages that countries specialize in. Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012)
conceptualize and empirically implement measures of the upstreamness of different industries along
production chains. Antràs and de Gortari (2020) build and quantify a model with a discrete number
of sequenced production stages, and explore how the geography of trade costs affects the equilibrium
formation of global production chains. In a related line of work, Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro
et al. (2019) investigate how firms that operate in sequential production chains would optimally
organize their sourcing strategies, vis-à-vis whether to integrate within firm boundaries or outsource
to arm’s length suppliers the procurement of each customized stage input. While their predictions
are often rich and subtle, these existing models do not fully rationalize the new patterns we uncover
in the Chinese data.
To the best of our knowledge, we present a first analysis of the relationship between firms’ inher-
ent attributes, production line position, internal operations, and performance over the firm lifecycle.
This provides a bridge between research by trade economists on GVC activity, and research by
3Recent work suggests that heterogeneous dynamics and shock propagation across firms can indeed have sizeable
effects on macro-economic outcomes. For example, Di Giovanni et al. (2018), Kramarz et al. (2020), and Gaubert and
Itskhoki (2018) find important effects of micro-level granularity on exposure to foreign demand shocks, international
business cycle comovement, and comparative advantage in the aggregate.
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development, industrial organization, and macro economists on firm growth and structural trans-
formation. Prior studies have linked access to imported inputs and learning from foreign partners
to firm productivity growth (e.g., Amiti and Konings 2007, Kasahara and Rodrigue 2008, Goldberg
et al. 2010, Halpern et al. 2015), examined trade-related growth in productivity and domestic value
added within Chinese firms (e.g., Brandt et al. 2012, Kee and Tang 2014, Tang et al. 2020), and
showed that processing trade can be a stepping stone to higher value added, more profitable and more
liquidity-intensive ordinary trade in the presence of financial frictions (e.g., Manova and Yu 2016). A
separate line of research has identified systematic patterns at both the country and firm levels in the
expansion of product scope and in the transition across products, based on similarity in input use,
upstream-downstream production links, or progression towards greater technological sophistication
(e.g., Hausmann et al. 2009, Bernard et al. 2010, Boehm et al. 2019). A growing body of work
has examined issues related to price-setting and rent-sharing along supply chains, specifically by
studying buyer-supplier data from markets in developing countries characterized by small upstream
producers and large downstream processors and distributors (e.g., Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa
2018, Macchiavello and Morjaria 2019, Cajal-Grossi et al. 2020).4 Finally, there is a long tradition
of studying the internal span of control in models of firm boundaries with (dis)economies of scope
and scale (Coase 1937, Williamson 1981, Becker and Murphy 1992, Kikuchi et al. 2018, Fally and
Hillberry 2018).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the data and the industry measure
of upstreamness. Section 3 uncovers Macro Trends in China’s position in GVCs during 1992-2014.
Section 4 establishes Firm Facts about the joint evolution of firm attributes, production line position,
production activities, and performance over the firm lifecycle. Section 5 presents a stylized model
of firm behavior with production fragmentation that rationalizes the empirical patterns. The last
section offers concluding remarks and points to avenues for future research.
2 Data
2.1 Trade statistics
We examine the evolution of China’s international trade activity over 1992-2014 using three com-
prehensive datasets from the General Administration of the Chinese Customs. The first dataset
covers the 1992-1996 period. It reports the value of total exports and imports in US dollars for
each Chinese province, HS 6-digit product (about 5,000 categories), firm ownership type, and trade
regime. The second dataset provides slightly more disaggregated data for the years 1997-1999. It
records the value of total exports and imports in US dollars for each Chinese city, HS 8-digit product
(about 6,500 categories), firm ownership type, and trade regime. We will use these first two datasets
to shed light on aggregate trends in import and export upstreamness for China as a whole during
the 1990s.
4This relates to an older literature on double marginalization in pricing decisions.
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The third dataset – the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) – comprises the universe of
China’s international trade transactions in 2000-2014. We observe for this period the value of firm-
level exports and imports in US dollars, by HS 8-digit product, firm ownership type, and transaction
trade regime. To abstract from the seasonality and lumpiness inherent in monthly trade flows, we
aggregate this raw data to the annual level. When appended to the first two datasets, this extends
our coverage of country-level trends to the entire 1992-2014 period. At the same time, the CCTS
provides our core sample for any firm-level regression analyses that we conduct.5,6
The Chinese customs records allow us to distinguish between several firm ownership structures
and operational modes. For ownership, the data separate out trade flows that are conducted re-
spectively by private domestic firms (PVT), state-owned enterprises (SOE), joint ventures (JV), and
foreign-owned multinational affiliates (MNC). We also observe the volume of trade conducted under
various institutionally sanctioned regimes. For 1992-2006, we observe a full breakdown into ordinary,
processing, and a residual category of “other” trade regimes; for 2007-2014, however, the data include
only a breakdown between ordinary and non-ordinary trade, with the processing and “other” trade
regimes reported as a single category. The processing trade regime has played a prominent role in
China’s growth as a manufacturing hub, as it permits firms to bring inputs into China intended for
further processing, assembly and re-exporting on behalf of a foreign buyer without incurring import
duties. Firms are allowed to simultaneously conduct both processing and ordinary trade activities,
and in practice about 25% of all exporters do so (Manova and Yu 2016).
Our sample period covers the dramatic expansion in China’s export and import activity. Over
1992-2014, China’s exports rose from about $84.9 billion in 1992 to close to $2.34 trillion in 2014 (in
current U.S. dollars), with a noticeable acceleration after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.7
This aggregate expansion was accompanied by substantial variation in trade participation across
firms. The number of firms engaged in exporting more than quadrupled from 62,746 in 2000 to
298,493 in 2014. Average exports per firm doubled from $3.97 million in 2000 to $7.85 million
in 2014, with large standard deviations around these means ($41.5 million in 2000 versus $102.4
million in 2014). On the importing side, we observe a similar pattern of growth: China’s total
imports increased from $80.6 billion in 1992 to $1.96 trillion in 2014, while average imports per firm
rose from $3.59 million in 2000 to $11.41 million in 2014. By the end of our sample period, China
had become the world’s largest exporter (with a 12.3% share of global merchandize trade), as well
as its second largest importer (accounting for 10.3% of global merchandize trade).8
5The datasets also contain information on the value of trade flows broken down by origin or destination country
(except for the years 2012-2014), although this dimension of the data will not be a focus of our study.
6The trade flows in the Chinese customs datasets span different vintages of HS codes. Where necessary, we have
used concordance tables provided by the United Nations Statistical Division to perform crosswalks across different
vintages of the HS 6-digit product codes, for example, before mapping them into the industries in the 2007 Chinese
Input-Output Tables; see the Data Appendix for more details. Note that for any given vintage, the HS product
classification system is consistent across countries only up to the 6-digit product level.
7The average annual growth rate in Chinese exports increased from 13.7% between 1992-2001 to 16.1% between
2001-2014. Similarly, the average annual growth rate for Chinese imports was 13.3% between 1992-2001, and 15.4%
between 2001-2014.
8This is based on the value of total merchandize exports (respectively, imports) for each year computed from the
CCTS, divided by the value of world merchandize trade from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
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We are particularly interested in the operations of firms that are involved in manufacturing value
chains. We therefore focus eventually in our analysis on a subsample that removes wholesalers and
retailers, as identified using a standard procedure in the literature that locates keywords related to
trade intermediation in firm names.9 During 2000-2014, the intermediaries we identify constitute
about 8% of all firms that conduct international trade; these account for 18.4% of China’s exports
and 19.9% of China’s imports by value.
Columns 1-3 in Table 1 provide summary statistics for the sample of non-intermediary firms in
the 2000-2014 panel. During this period, 532,704 firms pursued exporting and 422,818 firms pursued
importing at least once, while 259,439 firms were two-way traders (i.e., reporting both exports and
imports in the same year) in at least one year. We view the latter – the non-intermediary, two-way
traders – as firms that are particularly likely to be engaged in global production chains. These firms
generated log export revenues of 13.77 on average (standard deviation: 2.39), and their mean log
imports stood at 12.19 (standard deviation: 3.03). The panel of two-way traders comprises 31%
private domestic entities, 5% SOEs, 20% JVs, and 44% MNC affiliates. Of note, the share of private
firms increased sizeably over time, from 6% in 2000 to 48% in 2014, at the expense of the share
of SOEs and JVs. With regard to trade regimes, the average share of “non-ordinary” trade (i.e.,
processing plus “other” regimes) in firm exports and imports was 39% and 55%, respectively. (We
report this non-ordinary trade share as the data do not distinguish between processing and “other”
trade regimes between 2007-2014; we will later use the actual firm-level processing trade share when
we run regressions on the subsample for 2000-2006 that we are able to merge with the manufacturing
firm survey data.)
2.2 Production statistics
For information on the operations of Chinese firms, we draw on the Annual Survey of Industrial
Firms (ASIF) conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, available for 1999-2007. The
survey sample covers all state-owned enterprises (regardless of size), and private companies with
sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan.10 The ASIF contains information that would appear in a typical
firm balance sheet. This includes variables that speak to: size (total sales), inputs (employment,
average wage, intermediate input and material purchases), value added, asset structure (net fixed
assets, inventories), and performance (profits). In addition, we extract from the ASIF each firm’s
age and main industry of activity (as classified under China’s GB/T coding system). We use the
data to construct several standard measures of firm productivity, namely log real value added per
worker, as well as revenue-based TFP measures (TFPR) based on production function estimates
following the methodologies of Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg
9Ahn et al. (2011) propose this method for identifying intermediary firms in the Chinese customs data.
10This is equivalent to 0.6 million USD, based on the bilateral exchange rate in 2005. The ASIF data are cleaned
following the steps in Wang and Yu (2012), to remove: (a) firms in non-manufacturing industries (i.e., retaining only
firms with 2-digit GB/T industry code in 13-43); (b) observations with negative values for output, sales, exports,
capital, total assets, total fixed assets, wages, or intermediate inputs, and observations with zero employees; and (c)
observations with total assets less than total fixed assets or total liquid assets, or with total sales less than exports.
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et al. (2015). More specifically, to construct the TFPR measures, we draw directly on the ASIF
for data on labor inputs (employment) and intermediate input purchases, while we follow Brandt et
al. (2012) to compute a firm-level real capital stock series. The production function estimation is
performed for each TFPR measure at the GB/T 2-digit industry level (30 categories). (Please see
the Data Appendix for further details on the construction of the firm productivity measures.)
Our empirical analysis critically relies on combining firm-level trade and balance-sheet data from
the CCTS and ASIF respectively. While each dataset is organized around company registration
numbers, they do not share unique firm identifiers. Following standard practice in the literature, we
merge the customs records with the industrial survey using an algorithm that matches firms’ names
and contact information, including addresses and phone numbers.11 This procedure delivers a large
and broadly representative sample. We focus on a baseline matched ASIF-CCTS sample spanning
2000-2006, during which the coverage of firms and key variables in the ASIF is at its best. For
2000-2006, we are able to obtain ASIF balance-sheet data for 30% of the firms in the CCTS; these
firms mediate 51% of all exports and 43% of all imports recorded in the CCTS during these years.
Conversely, we locate CCTS trade transactions for 52% of all ASIF firms with positive exports; these
account for about 80% of the total export value reported in the ASIF balance sheets.
Columns 4-6 in Table 1 summarize the variation in firm size, inputs, productivity, and perfor-
mance in the full ASIF panel for 1999-2007, for key measures that will feature in our regressions. At
the same time, Columns 7-9 report the trade and production statistics for the matched ASIF-CCTS
panel of non-intermediary firms that are two-way traders in 2000-2006. Overall, the matched firms
tend to be larger and more productive than the average firm in the full ASIF panel, suggesting that
the merge is capturing firms that account for the majority of economic activity in the ASIF. The
matched firms also tend to exhibit larger import and export volumes than the full CCTS sample
(Columns 1-3), though the average upstreamness of the firm-level trade flows (based on the up-
streamness measures to be defined below) is very similar. (Appendix Table 1 reports unconditional
two-way correlations among the key firm indicators of productivity, size, and experience.)
2.3 Industry upstreamness
We use Chinese Input-Output (IO) Tables and the methodology developed in Fally (2012) and
Antràs et al. (2012) to construct a measure of the production line position of different industries.
Conceptually, the upstreamness of industry i, Ui, is a weighted average of the number of stages from
final demand at which i enters as an input in production processes. In an economy with N ≥ 1
industries, we calculate Ui as follows:





















+ . . . , (1)
where Yi is gross output in industry i, and Fi is the value of that output that goes directly to final
uses (i.e., consumption or investment). dij is the direct requirements coefficient in the Chinese IO
11See Wang and Yu (2012) for a detailed description of the matching procedure.
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Tables, this being the value of i used as an input to produce one yuan worth of industry j output.12
Note that the formula in (1) assigns a weight of 1 to the share of industry-i output that goes
directly to final use, a weight of 2 to the share that is channeled to final use through exactly one
other industry, and so on. Though expressed as an infinite sum in (1), Antràs et al. (2012) show that
Ui can be evaluated in a few succinct matrix algebra steps. In particular, let D denote the matrix
of direct requirement coefficients, namely: the N -by-N matrix whose i-th row and j-th column is
equal to dij . Likewise, define F to be a column vector whose i-th entry is Fi. The numerator of (1)
is then exactly equal to the i-th entry of [I −D]−2F , where I is the N -by-N identity matrix. The
denominator of (1), Yi, is in turn equal to the i-th entry of [I−D]−1F , which is the familiar Leontief
inverse matrix formula for industry gross output.13,14
By construction, one can see from (1) that Ui ≥ 1, with equality if and only if all of industry i’s
output goes directly to final use. If instead industry i tends to enter into production chains as an
intermediate input multiple stages prior to final demand, this would be reflected in a larger value of
Ui. For example, rubber can be used directly as a final product (one step to final consumers) or in
the manufacture of tyres that are in turn assembled into cars that are then sold as a final product
(three steps to final consumers). By contrast, apparel comprises mostly final goods (one step to final
consumers) and rarely serves as an intermediate input to other sectors. Rubber would thus have a
higher Ui value than apparel.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for Ui based on the 2007 China IO Tables, which contains a
relatively detailed set of 135 industries. The measure of industry upstreamness ranges from 1 to 5.86,
with a mean of 3.16 and a standard deviation of 1.12. As reported in the lower panel of the table,
the 10 most upstream industries comprise mainly sectors involved in the extraction and processing of
raw materials; on the other hand, the 10 least upstream industries include service sectors with a large
share of direct sales to consumers. We will proceed to use these measures of industry upstreamness
that have been benchmarked to the Chinese economy to describe the production line position of
China-based firms. Note that we document similar trends when using the disaggregate US 2002 IO
Tables (with 426 industries) as an alternative benchmark.
12Following Antràs et al. (2012), we scale dij by the factor Yi/(Yi − Xi + Mi − NIi), where Xi −Mi is equal to
the net exports of i, and NIi is the net change in inventories of i reported in the IO Tables. This correction accounts
for industry-i flows across country borders, as well as into and out of inventories; as Antràs et al. (2012) show, this
is the correction term implied by a proportionality assumption, that these industry-i flows are used as inputs across
industries j in the same proportion as what is observed in domestic cross-industry flows.
13Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012) moreover show that the upstreamness measure defined in (1) is the unique
solution to the following recurrence relation:




where aij = dij(Yj/Yi) is the share of industry-i’s output that is sold to industry j. Intuitively, industry i can be
viewed as being one stage more upstream than a weighted sum of the industries j that purchase i as an input.
14See also Miller and Termushoev (2017) and Antràs and Chor (2018) for a detailed exposition of the definition and
construction of this upstreamness measure when extended to the context of multi-country IO tables, such as the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD).
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2.4 Firm production line position
We apply the above industry measure of upstreamness, Ui, to characterize the production line posi-
tion of each firm that appears in the CCTS. To do so, we compute a weighted-average upstreamness
of firm f ’s imports (UMft ) and exports (U
X





























Since the CCTS reports trade flows by HS product, we use concordance tables between HS product
codes and Chinese IO industry categories to obtain the value of each firm’s exports (Xfit) and
imports (Mfit) in IO industry i in year t. Note that Xft =
∑N
i=1Xfit and Mft =
∑N
i=1Mfit are
firm f ’s total exports and imports respectively, so the weights in (2) are proportional to the export
(respectively, import) share of each industry in the firm’s overall trade profile.15
We interpret UMft and U
X
ft as summary measures of the global production line position of the
firm. In practice, global production processes can be structured in complex ways, with some portions
featuring sequences of stages (“snakes”), while other segments might be set up in a manner resembling
a hub-and-spoke (“spiders”, in the lingo of Baldwin and Venables 2013). The measures in (2)
seek to capture how firms are situated within these production processes, even in the absence of
granular information about how each firm is structuring and locating its specific operations. Instead,
(2) taps on the rich Chinese customs data on firm-level imports and exports, and combines these
with upstreamness measures for a relatively disaggregate set of industries, in order to infer – in an
admittedly stylized manner – the average positioning of a firm’s activities within GVCs relative to
final demand. Particularly for non-intermediary firms that both import and export, one can view
UMft as capturing the average upstreamness of materials and inputs that are brought into China by
the firm, and UXft as reflecting the average upstreamness of the semi-finished or finished goods sold
to buyers worldwide. In line with this, we view the difference, UMft −UXft , as informative of the span
of production stages that the firm oversees or coordinates from within China; this could take the
form of direct in-house production, but it does not exclude the possibility of outsourcing by the firm
to other suppliers.16
In Columns 1-3 of Table 1, we report summary statistics for UMft , U
X
ft , and U
M
ft −UXft , across firm-
years with positive exports and imports in the CCTS 2000-2014 panel (restricted to non-intermediary
15In principle, one could use industry upstreamness values that vary by source country – calculated from the respective
countries’ IO Tables – when constructing the firm-level upstreamness measures in (2), in order to reflect potential
differences across countries in local technological and production conditions. In practice, however, we do not pursue
this approach as currently available cross-country datasets of IO Tables tend to feature harmonized industry categories
that are relatively coarse, compared to the level of industry detail in the Chinese and US IO Tables. For what it is
worth, Antràs et al. (2012) report a pervasive positive correlation between industry upstreamness values computed for
different countries in the OECD STAN database; this features 41 industries, of which only 13 are in manufacturing.
16More generally, given the weighted-average nature of the firm-level upstreamness measures, there should be no
presumption that all production steps that are between UMft and U
X
ft stages from final demand are actually physically
performed by the firm within China.
10
firms only). The mean upstreamness of firm imports is 3.68, while the corresponding mean upstream-
ness of firm exports is 3.25, implying an average span of 0.42 production stages. There is significant
dispersion around these means, with the standard deviations equal to 0.76, 0.77, and 0.89 respec-
tively. As noted earlier, these metrics are very similar in the matched sample of non-intermediary
two-way traders with both CCTS customs and ASIF production data (Columns 7-9).
Before proceeding, it is useful to note several caveats about UMft and U
X
ft . While we observe the
detailed product composition of a firm’s exports, and can deduce the value of its domestic sales by
subtracting its total exports from total sales (where available in the ASIF), we do not have data
on the firm’s domestic sales by product. An analogous comment applies on the input side, as we
do not directly observe the product breakdown of a firm’s material inputs in the ASIF. Thus, UMft
and UXft should be seen as good reflections of the upstreamness of a firm’s overall operations, only
to the extent that these are well-represented by the product composition of the firm’s imports and
exports. Note further that the ASIF data do not provide information on whether the material inputs
are being purchased through intra-firm or arm’s length transactions. We are thus not able to draw
sharp conclusions on the basis of this data about the extent to which vertical integration of the
supply chain is being pursued relative to outsourcing.
3 China’s Global Production Line Position
3.1 Aggregate Trends
We start by examining key trends in China’s global production line position at the aggregate level
over the 1992-2014 period. We characterize this in each year by the weighted-average upstreamness
of China’s imports and exports, UMChina,t and U
X


















the value of imports classified as being from industry i expressed as a share of China’s total imports
in year t, while XitXt is the corresponding industry-i export share. In practice, for 2000-2014, we
compute (3) by taking a weighted average of the firm-level upstreamness measures defined earlier in















It is straightforward to see that (4) is equivalent to (3), since Mit =
∑
f Mfit and Xit =
∑
f Xfit.
We report the aggregate trends we uncover in a series of stylized facts. For the country as a
whole, we have:
Macro Trend 1: Over 1992-2014, Chinese imports became significantly more upstream, while
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Chinese exports became slightly more downstream, in relation to sources of final demand.
Figure 1A traces the evolution of UMChina,t and U
X
China,t over the entire 23-year sample period.
Two features stand out: First, Chinese imports are persistently more upstream than Chinese exports.
This reflects the tendency for China-based firms to use imported inputs when producing goods that
are then exported to foreign markets, and is consistent with – but not exclusively driven by – the
important role that processing trade has played in the Chinese economy. As we show below, this
relative position of China’s export and import upstreamness is a pronounced pattern that emerges
in many cuts of the data. Note that there is nothing mechanical that preordains that a country’s
imports will necessarily be more upstream on average than its exports. For example, countries rich
in natural resources tend to exhibit the opposite pattern, as their trade flows are composed mainly
of exports of raw materials in exchange for imports of final goods.17
Second, the production line position of China’s exports remained fairly stable between 1992-2014,
with a slight decline in UXChina,t from 3.29 to 3.21. By contrast, aggregate Chinese imports became
dramatically more upstream, with UMChina,t rising from an initial value of 3.57 to 4.02. This latter
rise was not driven simply by increased imports of agricultural or mineral commodities: When we
re-compute (3) using only IO industries in manufacturing – with the weights being the corresponding
share of manufacturing industry i in total manufacturing trade flows – we find that China’s import
upstreamness rose, albeit less sharply from 3.48 in 1992 to 3.74 in 2014 (see Appendix Figure 1A);
we obtain a similar pattern if we were to instead drop the entire section of HS codes for mineral
products, i.e., Section V, HS 25-27, which includes petroleum products, when computing aggregate
upstreamness (Appendix Figure 1B). Separately, we have checked that the upward trend in UMChina,t
was not due to China’s increased purchases of capital goods and equipment from abroad: Dropping
products classified as capital goods under the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) system, we still
find that import upstreamness rose from 3.82 in 1992 to 4.12 in 2014 (Appendix Figure 1C).18 This
“fanning out” pattern is moreover robust when UMChina,t and U
X
China,t are constructed using industry
upstreamness measures drawn from the 2002 US IO tables (Antràs et al. 2012), in place of the Ui
measures from the 2007 Chinese IO tables (Appendix Figure 1D).19
Figure 1A suggests that over time, Chinese firms have either developed the capability and/or
found it profitable to perform more upstream stages of production processes, so that they have come
to span wider segments of GVCs. This is broadly consistent with the observation that the domestic
17Using trade data from 2002, Chor (2014) reports that the weighted-average upstreamness of imports was lower
than that of exports for such resource-rich countries as Australia, New Zealand, and Brunei.
18Appendix Table 2 lists the 20 HS products that experienced the fastest import growth rates between 2002-2006,
among the subset of products with above-median upstreamness values. This list features a mix of agriculture-related
products (e.g., Buckwheat, Fertilizers), minerals (e.g., Ethylene, Liquefied natural gas), and intermediate inputs in
manufacturing (e.g., Coir yarn, Hot-rolled bars and rods), suggesting that none of these broad categories of products
was responsible on its own for the overall rise in the upstreamness of China’s imports. Note that we focus on 2002-2006,
as product codes are consistently recorded in the 2002 HS vintage during these years; this period also coincides with
the bulk of the rise in aggregate import upstreamness.
19The mean upstreamness value across industries in the 2002 US IO Tables is 2.09, lower than that in the 2007
Chinese IO Tables. This accounts for the lower export and import upstreamness values reflected on the vertical axes
in Appendix Figure 1D.
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value added embedded in Chinese exports has been rising over time (Kee and Tang 2016), to the
extent that spanning more production stages implies a greater use of Chinese factors of production.
The rise in China’s import upstreamness was moreover concentrated in the period prior to 2008,
with a tapering off in this trend subsequently. This is noteworthy, as it coincides with the onset of a
slowdown in the growth rate of Chinese trade relative to its GDP. As Figure 1B illustrates, the ratio
of China’s merchandize trade (exports plus imports) to GDP increased sharply following China’s
WTO accession in 2001, reaching about 70% in 2006.20 The years since have seen a decline in this
ratio that has persisted past the end of the Global Financial Crisis, prompting observers to label
this as a structural break in the manner of China’s engagement in international trade. This has been
attributed (among other causes) to the rebalancing of China’s economy towards domestic demand, or
a possible peaking out in supply chain offshoring from developed countries to China around this time
(IMF 2016, Frankel 2016). What our first Macro Trend indicates is that these broader economic
developments were accompanied by a steadying in the global production line position of China’s
imports (and exports).
With this aggregate trend in mind, we turn to explore different subsamples in the customs data.
Macro Trend 2: Over 1992-2014, the “fanning out pattern” of Chinese import and export
upstreamness was mainly driven by ordinary trade. In particular, the upstreamness of ordinary
imports rose more than for non-ordinary imports, though this was largely due to the increase in
ordinary-trade imports of mineral products.
Figure 2A plots the weighted-average upstreamness of Chinese trade flows, separately for non-
ordinary trade (dashed lines) and ordinary trade (solid lines). (Recall that non-ordinary trade
combines processing and “other” trade regimes, as we are unable to separate these out in the CCTS
from 2007-2014.) Note that non-ordinary imports are consistently more upstream than non-ordinary
exports; this is not surprising, given the goods-in-process and other intermediate inputs that are
shipped into China under the processing trade regime. On the other hand, the pattern we observe
for the evolution of ordinary trade flows mirrors closely that for aggregate trade flows seen in Figure
1A: Ordinary exports and imports had similar upstreamness values at the start of the sample period,
but ordinary imports became almost a full production stage more upstream than ordinary exports
by 2014. Along with this, the upstreamness of ordinary imports into China rose more sharply than
that of imports brought in under non-ordinary trade regimes. That said, this gap can be attributed
largely to imports of mineral products (which tend to be associated with high Ui values), as the
upstreamness of ordinary imports falls back in line with that of non-ordinary imports once HS codes
25-27 are excluded (Figure 2B).21
Macro Trend 3: Over 1992-2014, import and export upstreamness evolved similarly for all firm
ownership types. State-owned enterprises operated most upstream, private domestic firms operated
20The value of China’s aggregate merchandize trade is calculated directly from the customs data, while the data on
China’s GDP in current US dollars is from the World Development Indicators.
21We have also compared the global production line positioning of firms classified as trade intermediaries versus
non-intermediaries in Appendix Figure 2. The pattern exhibited across these two subsets of firms was similar, with a
clear rise in import upstreamness over the sample period, even while export upstreamness remained stable.
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in the middle, and joint ventures and foreign-owned affiliates operated closest to final demand. This
was largely due to state-owned enterprises’ imports of upstream mineral products.
Figure 3A reveals a clear and stable ranking of production line position across firms with dif-
ferent ownership structures, when we compute the weighted-average upstreamness measures in (3)
separately for each firm ownership type. The imports and exports of state-owned enterprises (SOE,
solid lines) are systematically more upstream than the corresponding trade flows of private domestic
firms (PVT, dashed lines); the latter in turn import and export products that are on average more
upstream than those of joint ventures and fully-owned multinational affiliates (JV/MNC, dot-dashed
lines). Over time, there has been an increase in the import upstreamness of all three firm types,
with the climb being most distinct for SOEs. As Figure 3B illustrates though, this gap between the
import upstreamness of SOEs and other ownership types is reduced when one removes mineral prod-
ucts (HS codes 25-27) from the calculation of the weighted-average upstreamness measures. This is
consistent with the increased role that state-owned enterprises have played in securing imports of
such mineral resources as inputs for China’s industrial activities.22
3.2 From Aggregate to Firm Upstreamness
The above trends in the evolution of China’s export and import upstreamness can arise from changes
among continuing firms and/or changes in the set of active trading firms. This motivates us to
undertake a decomposition of the observed changes in UMChina,t and U
X
China,t over time, to better
understand the firm-level sources of these aggregate shifts.




























where the firms f have been exactly partitioned into three subsets: (i) those that report imports in
both year t− 1 and t, CMt (“continuers”); (ii) those that do not report imports in year t− 1, but do
so in year t, ENMt (“entrants”); and (iii) those that report imports in year t− 1, but not in year t,
EXMt (“exiters”). The terms in the first line of (5) are changes in aggregate import upstreamness











UMf,t−1). The terms on the





∆UMft , reflects the
contribution of within-firm changes in upstreamness over time – which arise from changes in the mix









UMft , picks up the role of shifts across continuing firms in
22For example, Li et al. (2015) document how the monopoly power of China’s state-owned enterprises in upstream
raw materials industries has expanded over time, including in petrochemicals and electricity generation.
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each firm f ’s importance as an importer. An analogous formula to (5) holds on the exporting side.
Implementing (5) on the full CCTS firm-level panel, we obtain:
Macro Trend 4: Over the 2000-2014 period, the rise in China’s aggregate import upstreamness
stems from: (i) the entry of firms whose imports are more upstream on average than exiting firms
(i.e., the extensive margin); and (ii) a rise in import upstreamness within continuing firms on the
intensive margin. On the other hand, the modest decrease in China’s aggregate export upstreamness
reflects changes within and reallocations across continuing firms on the intensive margin.
Table 3 summarizes the main findings from this decomposition exercise. We report the changes
separately for 2000-2006 and for 2006-2014, bearing in mind that 2006 was when China’s trade-to-
GDP ratio reached its peak (Figure 1B). Note that the additive nature of the decomposition means
that we can simply add up the year-to-year changes corresponding to each term in (5) to obtain the
contributions of each respective term over an extended period. Focusing first on import flows, the
overall increase in UMChina,t during 2000-2006 (+0.137) is explained by two forces: the net extensive
margin (+0.734), which implies new importers were shipping more upstream products into China
than exiting importers; and the within-firm intensive margin (+0.190), so that the product mix of
imports was also becoming more upstream for continuing importers. These effects are offset to some
extent by the negative cross-firm term on the intensive margin (−0.788), as most individual firms
saw their shares in China’s total imports fall during this period. Turning to the export side, we
find that the modest fall in UXChina,t between 2000-2006 (−0.015) is accounted for by within-firm
shifts (−0.009) and cross-firm changes (−0.793) among continuing exporters (i.e., both terms on the
intensive margin), the latter in particular reflecting how individual firms were in general becoming
smaller as a share of China’s total exports during this period of rapid export growth. The pattern of
these changes for UMChina,t and U
X
China,t respectively are qualitatively similar prior to and after 2006,
though they taper off in magnitude in the later period.
The findings from Table 3 indicate that the within-firm changes on the intensive margin resemble
the broader “fanning out” pattern seen for China’s aggregate trade flows (from Figure 1A), with a
clear rise in import upstreamness and a modest decline in export upstreamness over time. We shed
further light on these within-firm shifts with:
Macro Trend 5: Within firms over time, imports became significantly more upstream, exports
became moderately more proximate to final demand, and the implied span of production stages per-
formed within China increased during 2000-2014.











αtY EARt + ϕf + εft. (6)
The outcome variable is in turn the average upstreamness of a firm’s imports (UMft ), the average
upstreamness of a firm’s exports (UXft), and the difference between these two (U
M
ft −UXft), as defined
earlier in (2). We quantify common time trends in firms’ global production line position by estimating
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coefficients αt for a full set of year dummies Y EARt, conditional on firm fixed effects, ϕf . The αt’s
for 2001 ≤ t ≤ 2014 thus capture average cumulative changes (relative to 2000) based on all firms
that are active in year t. We conservatively cluster the standard errors by firm, to account for
possible correlated shocks within firms over time in the εft error terms.
23
In Columns 1-2 of Table 4, we estimate (6) for UMft and U
X
ft respectively using the full CCTS
panel for 2000-2014. Columns 3-4 run these same regressions after excluding trade intermediaries,
given that the import and export flows of these companies are often not tied to actual production
decisions made by these firms. In both the full CCTS sample and the non-intermediary subsample,
we find that the export upstreamness of firms declined steadily but moderately between 2000-2014,
while the upstreamness of their imports rose quickly. The point estimates for the αt’s are significant
across these four columns for almost all years, and typically rise in absolute value over time. Note
that the size of the increase in import upstreamness over time is an order of magnitude larger than
the corresponding decrease in export upstreamness.
In the rest of Table 4, we further restrict the sample to non-intermediary firm-year observations
that record a positive volume of both exports and imports, these being firms most likely to be
engaged in GVCs. We find in Column 5 that the import upstreamness of these non-intermediary
two-way traders also increased dramatically during 2000-2014. On the other hand, their exports
became only slightly more proximate to final demand; this trend tapered off though after 2009,
so that by 2014, the average level of firms’ export upstreamness at the end of the sample period
was not statistically distinguishable from that at the start in 2000 (see the point estimate of α2014
in Column 6). For a representative firm, the implied cumulative changes in UMft and U
X
ft over this
period were 0.1992 and 0.0001 respectively, from average starting levels of 3.6961 and 3.2119 in 2000.
As a result, the gap between the upstreamness of firms’ imports and exports widened, implying an
expansion in the span of stages performed within China of 0.1991 on average, or more than 41% up
from the initial average value of UMft −UXft of 0.4842 (Column 7).24 In Appendix Table 3, we further
show that these trends in firms’ production line position are robust even when we control for the
number of HS 6-digit products that the firm imports and/or the number of HS 6-digit products that
it exports in each year. There is a modest reduction in the point estimates for the αt’s, but these
still imply a cumulative average change in the span of stages, UMft − UXft , of 0.1594. This suggests
that the expansion along the production chain within firms reflects the shifting of production steps
into China, rather than changes in input and output product scope per se.25
Figure 4 illustrates these within-firm changes over time in the span of stages performed in China,
through several kernel density plots of UMft −UXft . We focus on the set of all non-intermediary firms
23The regression results in all tables in this paper are unaffected if we were to instead use heteroskedasticity-robust
(but unclustered) standard errors.
24We obtain very similar results if we were to restrict the regressions to the subsample of non-intermediary firms that
were “two-way traders” in every year between 2000-2014, or in every year between 2000-2006 (available on request).
The latter corresponds to the years for which we merge the CCTS with the ASIF manufacturing survey data.
25The estimates from Appendix Table 3 indicate that importing further upstream is associated with a smaller number
of imported HS6 products. At the same time, firms whose exports are more proximate to final demand (i.e., are less
upstream) tend to export more products. However, the implied economic magnitude of each additional imported
(respectively, exported) product on firms’ production staging is relatively small.
16
that were two-way traders throughout the entire duration of our sample period; we refer to these
firms in Figure 4 as “survivors”. These firms tend to span more production stages as they age, as can
be seen from the rightward shift in the distribution of UMft − UXft for “survivors” between 2000 and
2014. One can compare these “survivors” in 2014 against firms that were “new” two-way traders in
2014, these being non-intermediary firms that both export and import in 2014 but not in 2013. The
kernel density plot of UMft −UXft for the new two-way traders is concentrated more tightly around its
peak value, confirming that these firms tend to perform a narrower span of production stages than
firms that have continuously been two-way traders for many prior years.26
Together, the patterns in Figure 4 and Table 4 suggest that Chinese firms that are new to
importing or exporting typically begin by conducting fewer production steps than existing traders,
and then gradually expand the scope of their production stages as they survive and grow. We pick
up on this theme in the next section, where we investigate further the correlates of a firm’s global
production line position over the firm lifecycle.
4 Firm Lifecycle Facts
4.1 Estimation approach
We examine how the global production line position of Chinese firms evolves over time with their
operations and performance using data from the matched ASIF-CCTS panel. This proceeds in three
steps. We first analyze how productivity, size and experience correlate with import and export
upstreamness at the firm level. Second, we document how firms’ global production line position
varies with the structure of firms’ inputs, costs, and assets. Lastly, we study the link between
production staging, profits, and profitability.
Our goal is twofold. On the one hand, we want to agnostically establish novel and robust stylized
facts that paint a coherent picture of how key firm attributes and performance metrics co-evolve with
the global production line position of Chinese firms. At the same time, we also aim to inform the
determinants and consequences of firms’ participation in GVCs, and to offer a conceptual framework
that can rationalize the empirical patterns through the lens of profit maximization. In Section 5,
we will interpret the first set of results in terms of drivers of firms’ production line position, and the
second and third sets of results in terms of its correlates and outcomes.








= α+ βZft + ΓΩft + ϕf + ϕst + εft, and (7)








+ ΓΩft + ϕf + ϕst + εft. (8)
26We performed a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test to compare the distributions of UMft − UXft for: (i) “survivors” in 2000
against “survivors” in 2014; and (ii) “survivors” in 2014 against “new” two-way traders in 2014. All tests comfortably
rejected the null hypothesis of identical distributions, with p-values smaller than 0.0001. We obtain virtually identical
findings if we were to alternatively define non-intermediary firms that were two-way traders in both 2000 and 2014 (but
not necessarily in all years in between) to be “survivors”, and non-intermediary firms that were two-way traders in
2014, but not in 2000, to be “new” two-way traders (Appendix Figure 3). Likewise, the density plots are very similar
if we were to include trade intermediaries in the sample (available on request).
17
In regression (7), the outcome variable is in turn one of the three measures of firms’ participation
in GVCs: the average upstreamness of firm imports, UMft , the average upstreamness of firm exports,
UXft , and the difference between these two, U
M
ft − UXft . The main variables of interest on the right-
hand side, Zft, will be measures of firm productivity, size, and experience, which we view as potential
drivers of a firm’s decision over the span of stages to be engaged in. Our baseline findings presented
in Section 4.2.1 come from estimating (7) via ordinary least squares (OLS). We also report results
in Section 4.2.2 where we adopt an instrumental variable for firm productivity, constructed as a
predicted foreign demand shock that a firm is plausibly exposed to.
In regression (8), we instead examine how various aspects of a firm’s operations, Yft – pertaining
to value added, input purchases, costs incurred, and asset structure – correlate with its global
production line position (Section 4.3). We also consider how performance metrics related to firm




ft , and U
M
ft − UXft (Section 4.4). We view the Yft and Πft on the
left-hand side of (8) to be variables that are either decided upon jointly with a firm’s choice over its
span of production stages (such as input purchases) or outcomes of that decision (such as profits).
The results we present for (8) are OLS estimates, so these should be viewed as informative partial
correlations of how these features of the firm move in tandem with its span of stages.
In both (7) and (8), we absorb permanent observed and unobserved firm characteristics with
firm fixed effects, ϕf . Likewise, we control for sector-specific supply and demand shocks with sector-
by-year dummies, ϕst, where s denotes the GB/T 4-digit industry (up to 480 categories) of firm f ’s
primary activity as designated in the ASIF. We include also several time-varying firm characteristics,
Ωft, namely physical and human capital intensity, proxied respectively by log net fixed assets per
worker and the log average wage. All results are robust to omitting these controls for factor inten-
sities, and their inclusion has minimal effect on the coefficient estimates of interest. For each firm
attribute in Zft, Yft and Πft, we drop the tail 1% of observations across firms from the regression
sample given the skew that is often present in these variables; for example, we drop firms with a log
real value added per worker smaller than its 1st percentile and larger than its 99th percentile when
exploring the correlation of this productivity variable with firm-level upstreamness. (The results are
similar if we were to winsorize, rather than censor, the tail 1% values for each variable.) All standard
errors are clustered by firm to allow for correlated shocks within firms over time.
Note that the ϕf ’s account for intransient variation in institutional and market conditions across
firm locations (i.e., Chinese cities, provinces, or special economic zones), such as labor costs, capital
availability, infrastructure, and contract enforcement. In addition, these firm fixed effects subsume
systematic technological and operational differences across firm ownership types. Since the ϕf ’s
capture firms’ primary industry of activity, they also embed systematic variation at the sector level
in available production techniques, factor intensities, and technological scope for fragmenting manu-
facturing stages across establishments; at the same time, the ϕst’s in the background control flexibly
for potential time trends in these sector-level forces.
The coefficient of interest, β, is therefore identified from the variation within firms over their
lifecycle, and reflects how changes in their supply chain position are associated with changes in
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their attributes and outcomes. Relating this back to the decomposition of aggregate upstreamness
in Table 3, this is the variation captured by the intensive margin term that focuses on within-firm
changes in UMft and U
X
ft . We work primarily with these within-firm regression specifications, as these
allow us to include a relatively thorough set of fixed effects to absorb potential omitted variables.
(We briefly present some results we obtain from a specification that instead teases out patterns in
the variation across firms; see Appendix Table 6.)
We report results from running (7) and (8), when using firms in the matched ASIF-CCTS panel
that are non-intermediary two-way traders.27 The sample has about 175,000 observations, smaller
than the roughly 1,000,000 firm-year observations available for the same category of firms in the
earlier 2000-2014 CCTS panel (Columns 5-7, Table 4). Recall that this is because the ASIF data
spans a shorter time period, and the firm match between the CCTS and the ASIF is comprehensive
but incomplete. Importantly, this restriction in sample size does not appear to affect our qualitative
findings. For example, restricting the sample to ASIF-CCTS matched firms in 2000-2006 does not
affect the conclusions drawn from the regressions that otherwise use the full 2000-2014 CCTS panel
(e.g., from Table 4). We have also confirmed that all results hold when we broaden the ASIF-
CCTS sample by relaxing the condition that a firm be a two-way trader (available on request). We
document the findings that follow as a series of Firm Facts.
4.2 Firm productivity, size and experience
We first provide evidence that firms’ global production line position evolved systematically with
their productivity, size and experience during this period of rapid trade liberalization for China. We
estimate specification (7) using various measures of these three firm attributes as the variable of
interest, Zft.
Firm Fact 1: When firms become more productive, bigger, or more experienced, their imports
become significantly more upstream, their exports become moderately more proximate to final demand,
and they span more production stages (in China).
As noted earlier in Section 2.4, these empirical findings do not directly reveal whether the expan-
sion along global production lines occurred through firms’ performing more manufacturing stages
themselves or through the sourcing of previously imported inputs (i.e., previously offshored stages)
from other domestic suppliers. This is because the ASIF data do not provide a detailed product-
level breakdown of the material inputs that the firm purchases, nor the source – whether domestic
or foreign – of these inputs. That said, these results do indicate that firms are taking responsibility
for the supervision and completion of a wider segment of the supply chain within China, regardless
of how that is operationalized. Our later findings in Section 4.3 for firms’ value added, inputs and
cost structure will also suggest that firms themselves are performing at least some of these additional
production steps in-house.
27The two-way non-intermediaries account for more than 92% of both the export and import value recorded for the
firms that are in the matched ASIF-CCTS sample.
19
4.2.1 OLS correlation
We begin with the role of firm productivity in Table 5. We find consistent patterns using several
standard revenue-based measures of productivity in the literature, which we can readily construct
from the ASIF.28 In Panel A, we consider log real value added per worker, constructed as the differ-
ence between output value and intermediate inputs, after deflating respectively by output and input
deflators specific to the firm’s primary GB/T 4-digit industry. In Panels B-D, we apply respectively
the Olley-Pakes (OP), Levinsohn-Petrin (LP), and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (ACF) methodologies
to obtain TFPR residuals from a production function estimated separately for each GB/T 2-digit
industry. We arrive at similar findings and conclusions if we were to allow for more flexibility, by
estimating separate production functions for firms under the three broad ownership categories (SOE,
PVT, JV/MNC) within each GB/T 2-digit industry.
We document in each Panel in Table 5 that within firms over time, higher productivity is asso-
ciated with significantly more upstream imports (a higher UMft , Column 1) and with a stable profile
in the proximity of exports to final demand (no significant change in UXft , Column 2). As a result,
productivity improvements are accompanied by firms managing a wider span of stages within China
(an increase in UMft − UXft , Column 3). Moreover, the widening of the span of stages is not driven
by where along the production chain firms operate: We continue to obtain a positive and significant
correlation between firm productivity and UMft − UXft , with the coefficient estimate being largely
unchanged, when we further condition on the GVC position of the firm’s exports, UXft , in Column 4.
It is useful to translate the coefficients in Table 5 into implied magnitudes for the span of stages
that firms undertake in China. Bearing in mind the within-firm nature of the regression specification,
we take the annualized change in each firm’s productivity over time (calculated based on the first
and final years in which the firm was active in the ASIF-CCTS panel), and consider the mean value
of these within-firm changes as a benchmark shift in productivity. With this hypothetical shift, the
implied change in the span of stages, UMft −UXft , ranges from 0.001 (for log TFPR OP) to 0.003 (for
log TFPR LP).29 This should be viewed against the average annual within-firm change in UMft −UXft
of 0.029 in the data. While it appears that within-firm productivity changes only account for modest
shifts in the span of production stages, note that we will obtain much larger effects when we turn to
the IV estimates in Section 4.2.2.
We examine in Table 6 the role of firm size and experience, which are firm attributes often closely
linked to productivity. In Panel A, we use log total nominal sales as a comprehensive measure of firm
scale.30 As an alternative in Panel B, we consider log employment as a quantity-based indicator of
production scale. Across both measures of firm size, we consistently observe that as firms grow bigger,
28We focus on TFPR, as the ASIF does not include information on input and output prices at the level of individual
firms to allow the construction of reliable quantity-based measures of productivity (TFPQ). All price deflators that we
have used in the data work are instead industry-level series.
29As an example, the mean annual within-firm change in log TFPR LP in Panel C is 0.198, so the associated change
in the span of stages is: 0.0138× 0.198 ≈ 0.003.
30As (7) includes industry-year fixed effects, and output deflators are only available at the industry level, we would
obtain equivalent results if the dependent variable were instead log real sales.
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they import inputs that are further upstream (Column 1), and shift exports towards products that
are more proximate to the end-user (Column 2). These patterns contribute to the span of production
stages UMft − UXft widening significantly with firm size, regardless of whether or not one conditions
on where along the supply chain the firm is anchored as proxied by UXft (Columns 3 and 4).
31
In Panel C of Table 6, we consider firm age as a broad measure of experience. We infer this
from the year of a firm’s establishment as reported in the ASIF; to accommodate entrants during
our sample period, we work with log(age + 1). In Panel D, we focus on experience specifically with
production for and sales to foreign markets. For a firm that is active in year t, we capture this by
the log of its cumulative past exports up to year t−1 as recorded in the CCTS. As there is potential
censoring of this variable for firms that began exporting prior to 2000, we include an interaction term
between log cumulative past exports as described and an indicator variable for whether the firm was
an active exporter in 2000.32 The regression results indicate that as companies mature and become
more experienced participants in global trade, they tend to expand the number of production stages
they conduct by importing more upstream inputs, while shifting slightly the positioning of their
exports closer to final demand (Columns 1-3); this finding does not depend on whether or not we
control for the positioning of a firm’s exports (Column 4).
The effects of firm size and experience that can be inferred from Table 6 are fairly sizeable, when
benchmarked using the mean annual within-firm change for each firm attribute (as in the earlier
calculations with the productivity measures). To give two examples, the mean annual within-firm
shift in log sales among Chinese firms can explain an increase of 0.006 in the span of stages performed,
while the corresponding effect of export experience (log cumulative past exports) is an even larger
expansion of 0.025 in UMft − UXft .33
We have performed several checks to verify the robustness of these relationships between firms’
productivity, size and experience on the one hand, and the decisions made over production staging.
First, as mentioned earlier, all findings hold when omitting the controls for firms’ capital and skill
intensity. The baseline specifications with these controls should be interpreted with a grain of salt
to the extent that productivity, size and experience are primitives that determine firm operations
including skill and capital use. The estimates in Tables 5-6 nevertheless suggest that expansion
into more production stages is associated with lower capital intensity and higher skill intensity.
Separately, we have also confirmed that the results are not driven by differences across firms in their
participation in processing versus ordinary trade. Our findings in Tables 5-6 are once again all robust
31In Appendix Table 4, Panel A, we report a similar set of correlations when we proxy for firm size using its log
current total (worldwide) exports as reported in the CCTS customs records.
32The results are very similar if we instead use firms’ cumulative past imports – constructed in and allowing for
censoring in the regression in an analogous manner – to capture experience with foreign suppliers.
33The mean annual within-firm change in log sales in our sample is 0.167; based on the Panel A, Column 3 coefficient
estimate, this translates into an increase in the span of stages of 0.0335 × 0.167 ≈ 0.006. For cumulative exports, we
focus on the coefficient of the main effect term, as the interaction with the dummy for whether cumulative exports
might be censored is not statistically significant. The mean annual within-firm change in log past exports is 1.082,
implying a shift in the span of stages of 0.0235× 1.082 ≈ 0.025.
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to controlling for the share of a firm’s exports conducted under the processing trade regime.34,35
Third, our results continue to hold for different constructions of the firm-level upstreamness measures.
In particular, this is true when we work with the weighted-average upstreamness measures that retain
only products that map to manufacturing industries, or with the version that drops mineral products
(HS codes 25-27).
We have further explored whether the relationship between productivity and the upstreamness
of a firm’s trade flows might exhibit heterogeneity across firm ownership types. Accordingly, Ap-
pendix Table 5 presents results from estimating (7) with firm productivity Zft interacted with a set
of dummies for the firm’s ownership status (respectively, SOE, PVT, or JVC/MNC).36 Interestingly,
the positive correlation between firm productivity and the span of stages is strongest for joint ven-
tures and multinational affiliates across all revenue-based productivity measures; while the effect is
generally positive for private domestic firms, these coefficients tend to be less precisely estimated.
A potential explanation could be that firms with significant foreign ownership shares are less finan-
cially constrained than firms under different ownership structures (c.f., Manova et al. 2015), and can
therefore more readily expand their span of stages in response to productivity improvements.37
4.2.2 IV causality
The results from OLS specification (7) reveal informative systematic correlations between key at-
tributes of Chinese firms and their production line position. We now provide complementary evidence
based on two-stage-least-squares estimation, which indicates that changes in productivity can have
causal effects on firms’ production staging.
Our IV strategy seeks to exploit plausibly exogenous positive shocks to foreign demand, which
can in turn raise firms’ exports and thereby total sales. Such shocks can further boost firm TFP –
34Recall that the CCTS data from 2000-2006 record whether each transaction occurs under the ordinary trade regime
(exporting under a firm’s own brand name) or the processing trade regime (exporting under contract with a foreign
buyer). The export processing share is a continuous measure between 0 and 1, since firms can conduct both ordinary
and processing trade.
35Alternatively, the export processing share can itself be interpreted as a proxy for a firm’s experience with in-
ternational trade, as the processing trade regime is often viewed as a platform through which Chinese firms started
engaging in GVCs. Appendix Table 4, Panel B, reports regressions where we adopt this perspective and use the export
processing share as the firm attribute Zft in specification (7). We indeed find that firms that conduct a greater share of
processing trade import products (presumably inputs) that are more upstream, export products closer to final demand,
and thus span a greater set of production stages in China. Consistent with our findings for firms’ trade experience,
this may signal that producing on behalf of a foreign buyer engenders knowledge transfer that enables Chinese firms
to undertake more manufacturing steps.
36Note that these three ownership types fully span all firms in our sample, so that the main effects of these firm
ownership dummies are subsumed by the firm fixed effects.
37We have also examined whether the patterns we have documented might also be present in cross-sectional variation.
To do so, we replace the firm fixed effects in (7) with a full set of GB/T 4-digit industry by city by ownership-type
dummies, while retaining the industry-by-year fixed effects, ϕst. Appendix Table 6 reports the results from this
exercise. We do not obtain as consistent a pattern of correlations across all four TFP measures, possibly because these
regressions do not control as thoroughly for potential firm-level variables that could be affecting both firm productivity
and its production staging decisions. For log real value added per worker and TFP ACF (Panels A and D), higher
firm productivity is positively correlated with both the upstreamness of imports and exports; we do find that higher
productivity is associated with a wider span of stages, but only if we condition on UXft (Column 4), suggesting that the
proximity of the firm’s exports to final demand is a key omitted variable. On the other hand, the effect of productivity
on UMft − UXft is not precisely estimated for TFPR OP and TFPR LP (Panels B and C).
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through improvements in production techniques or processes – in the presence of economies of scale
or learning from exporting. Taken together, a positive shock to foreign demand can be expected to
raise revenue-based measures of firm productivity, such as those we have computed for the ASIF-
CCTS panel. Since we are interested in the evolution of production activities within firms over time,
we require a variable that captures movements in foreign demand at the firm-year level.
We construct our ExportIVft instrument by first computing a shift-share projected growth rate
in foreign demand for firm f ’s products from year t − 1 to t. This is done by taking a weighted-
average of the year-on-year growth in rest-of-the-world export flows; in particular, we draw on the
CEPII BACI dataset for its information on total exports emanating from the rest of the world (i.e.,
excluding China), XROW,cpt, disaggregated by destination country c and HS 6-digit product p. To
capture the degree of exposure of each firm f on the exporting front to these country-by-product




in the first year (indexed by 0) where we observe firm f exporting in the CCTS data. Combining
this projected growth rate with information on the one-year lagged level of f ’s exports, we obtain
a predicted (log) level of firm f ’s exports in year t, which will serve as our IV. The precise formula








where we exclude China as a destination country c in the weighted average in (9).38 Note that for
each firm f , we construct ExportIVft for years in which t − 1 > 0, so that the predicted country-
by-product export growth rates in (9) do not use data from years that overlap with the initial year
0 for which export share weights are available for the firm in question. Given that our ASIF-CCTS
panel starts in 2000, this means that we have been conservative in constructing ExportIVft only for
2002-2006. The above constitutes a valid instrument if the shifts in foreign demand captured by the
rest-of-the-world trade shocks are exogenous from the perspective of individual Chinese firms f , and
insofar as the consequent effects on firms’ production staging decisions are mediated through their
effect on firm productivity.
Table 7 presents our estimates from re-running (7) with ExportIVft as an instrumental variable
for each of the measures of firm productivity. These reproduce the pattern of correlations seen earlier
in Table 5, and indicate that there is a causal dimension in the effects of shocks to firm productivity
on Chinese firms’ GVC positioning. The first stage in Column 1 confirms that ExportIVft has
strong predictive power: the IV has an expected positive and significant effect on firm productivity,
and the F-statistics are moreover large with the exception of log TFPR OP (Panel B). The results
for the second stage in Columns 2-5 corroborate the earlier OLS analysis. The point estimates we
obtain are moreover considerably larger in all panels, yielding statistically significant results (except
38The distribution of country-by-HS6-product export growth rates has both large positive and negative extreme
values, and so we winsorize (logXROW,cpt − logXROW,cp,t−1) at its 10th and 90th percentiles when calculating
ExportIVft.
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for log TFPR OP). This is consistent both with measurement error in firm productivity and with
larger responses to exogenous shocks to productivity compared to changes that are endogenously
initiated by the firm. Consequently, the implied magnitudes of these effects on the span of stages
is much bigger: For example, for the mean within-firm annual change in log TFPR LP quoted in
Section 4.2.1, the implied increase in UMft − UXft is now 0.039, larger than the actual within-firm
annual change of 0.029 seen in the data.39
In Appendix Table 7, we present results when using the predicted foreign demand variable as an
IV for firm size, as measured either by log sales or log employment. Changes in foreign demand can
in principle move firm size both directly holding productivity fixed, and indirectly by raising firm
productivity. The evidence in Appendix Table 7 is consistent with the earlier OLS results (in Table
6) on the strong relationship between firm size and GVC positioning.
Much like exogenous shocks to foreign demand, exogenous shocks to foreign supply can in prin-
ciple also move firm productivity and size. For example, a rise in foreign productivity or product
quality may induce Chinese firms to source more foreign inputs, lower their marginal production
costs, and thereby increase their market appeal and resultant sales. Shocks to imported input sup-
ply can also influence firm TFP. This can occur directly through improved access to superior or
cheaper equipment that allows firms to upgrade their production processes, or indirectly through
complementarities between production inputs and production technologies or management practices.
Appendix Table 8 presents IV regressions where we use an ImportIVft instrument that is the ana-
logue of (9) for Chinese firms’ imports, based on how shocks experienced in rest-of-the-world imports
(disaggregated by origin country and HS6 product) potentially impact the firm f given its initial
import profile. The results this yields are very much consistent with what we have seen in Table 7
from using ExportIVft.
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4.3 Firm value added, costs and assets
We next establish that changes in firms’ global production line position are accompanied by shifts in
their value added, input usage, cost structure, and asset composition. Here, we work off specification
(8) using different indicators for firm operations, Yft, as the left-hand side variable.
Firm Fact 2: When firms span more production stages (in China), they increase their value
added in production, total intermediate input purchases, and total wagebill proportionately with sales.
39Specifically, using the Column 4 point estimate in Panel C of Table 7, and following steps similar to footnote 29,
we have: 0.1966× 0.198 ≈ 0.039.








where MROW,cpt is the value of total imports of HS6-digit product p by the rest of the world (excluding China) from
origin country c in year t;
Mfcp,0
Mf,0
is the share of country c and product p in firm f ’s imports, in the initial year 0 in
which the firm records imports in the CCTS; and Mf,t−1 is firm f ’s lagged total imports (in year t− 1). Although it
is possible to use both ExportIVft and ImportIVft simultaneously as instruments, we do not report these results as
they tend not to pass the over-identification test.
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In Table 8, Panel A examines the relationship between firms’ span of stages and the amount
of value they add in production. Columns 1 and 2 show that companies whose imports are more
upstream, and whose exports are more proximate to final demand, respectively report higher log
real value added, though the correlation with UXft is just short of significance at the 10% level. As a
result, value added rises sharply as the distance between the position of firms’ imports and exports
in GVCs widens: Based on the estimates in Column 3, a one-stage increase in UMft −UXft is associated
with real value added that is on average 3.1% higher.
This relationship may appear at first glance to be somewhat mechanical: When a firm spans
more stages, one might naturally expect it to be responsible for a greater amount of value added in
the production process. That said, Column 4 shows that this partial correlation is instead explained
by an associated scaling up of firm operations and sales. We condition here on log real firm sales
to capture the firm’s gross output. Value added indeed moves in step with total sales, with a
point estimate close to 1. Moreover, this proportional adjustment fully explains the unconditional
correlation between value added and UMft − UXft , as the coefficient on the latter is now statistically
indistinguishable from 0. These findings in Columns 3-4 – on how the span of production stages
correlates conditionally with the firm’s value added – are unchanged even if we were to further control
for UXft to capture the proximity to final demand of the products the firm exports; this statement
on robustness in fact applies to Columns 3-4 for each of the subsequent firm attributes considered
as left-hand side variables in Tables 8-10 (all panels available on request).
We next consider the pattern of firms’ variable input use. Panel B of Table 8 reveals that firms
significantly increase their total input purchases when they broaden the scope of manufacturing steps
they undertake in China. This occurs both when they import from abroad inputs that are further
upstream (Column 1), and when they export products that are more proximate to final demand
(Column 2). Overall, a widening in UMft − UXft by one production stage is associated within firms
with real input purchases that are 2.9% higher (Column 3). We obtain the same pattern in Panel
C when looking more specifically at labor inputs, as captured by firms’ total wagebill (computed
from the ASIF as the average wage times total employment). There, a unit increase in a firm’s span
of stages corresponds to a total outlay on wages that is 3.1% greater (Column 3). As with value
added in Panel A, these increases in variable costs entirely reflect an expansion in the scale of firms’
output, as the partial correlation is not statistically significant once we condition on log real sales
(Column 4, Panels B-C).
Interestingly, we find in Panel D that the span of a firm’s operations in global production lines,
UMft − UXft , is negatively correlated with the ratio of its imports relative to its total intermediate
input purchases (Column 3). At the same time, on the exporting side, we find in Panel E that
the span of stages conducted within China is positively correlated with a firm’s export intensity, as
proxied by its export-to-sales ratio. Both of these patterns persist when controlling for the firm’s
log sales (Column 4), indicating that these are not merely artefacts of an expansion in the overall
scale of firm operations. Put otherwise, as the scope of stages undertaken in China has widened,
there appears to have been some switching within firms towards procuring a greater share of inputs
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from domestic sources, even as a larger share of the output produced is destined for foreign markets.
This interpretation should be viewed with some caution, given that we do not directly observe the
domestic production network or the composition of firms’ domestic inputs, but they nevertheless
hint at some subtle shifts in the manner of Chinese firms’ engagement in GVCs. (We will return to
these empirical patterns in Section 5 with a brief discussion.)
We turn next to characterize the relationships between firms’ GVC position and various indicators
of their cost and asset structure.
Firm Fact 3: When firms span more production stages (in China), they increase the level and
share of their fixed costs and assets.
In Panels A and B of Table 9, we consider respectively the log level of net fixed plant, property
and equipment and its share in total book-value assets. These measures reflect respectively how
important the stock of long-term capital is to firm operations in an absolute and in a relative sense.
In Panels C and D of Table 9, we study instead the log value of inventories and their value relative
to total assets. Outstanding inventories constitute a flow of short-term fixed costs of manufacturing
and maintaining supply capacity.
We observe that when firms manage more production stages (in China), they maintain more
fixed assets and incur higher fixed costs. In particular, the value and share of fixed assets (Panels
A-B), as well as of inventories (Panels C-D), all rise with the upstreamness of imports UMft and with
the span of production stages UMft − UXft . Translating the point estimates in Column 3 of Panels A
and C into implied magnitudes, a one-stage widening of the span of production stages is associated
with 1.5% higher investment in fixed assets and 2.4% more inventory holdings.
Together, the patterns in Tables 8-9 are consistent with firms incurring higher fixed and variable
costs when they undertake more manufacturing stages within China.
4.4 Firm profits and profitability
As a final piece of empirical evidence, we explore how a firm’s global production line position relates
to its performance in terms of profits and profitability. For this, we estimate specification (8) using
several different measures, Πft, of profit levels and profit margins. The results reported in Table 10
can be summarized as:
Firm Fact 4: When firms span more production stages (in China), they earn higher profits that
rise proportionately with sales. The expansion in stages however does not change their profitability
margins.
In Panel A of Table 10, we study total real profits from operations, after applying industry-
specific output deflators. The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that this profit variable exhibits
a particularly large dispersion; bear in mind that real profits for any given firm-year can be negative,
and the raw data contain both large positive and negative reported profits. We therefore trim the
tail 5% of observations (at both tails) from our sample for the regressions in Panel A. In the rest of
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the table, we consider a series of measures of firm profitability. In Panel B, we analyze the profit-
to-sales ratio, as an indicator of the profit margin relative to the value of gross output. In Panel
C, we take instead the profit-to-value-added ratio, which captures profitability relative to the value
the firm adds in production once all purchased intermediates have been accounted for. In Panel D,
we look at the return on assets (ROA) defined as profits relative to total assets. While the previous
two ratios can be seen as reflecting short-term profitability from current production and sales, ROA
signals the long-term profitability of firm assets and implicitly of the stock of investment.41
Table 10 demonstrates that firms earn systematically higher profits when they complete more
production stages in GVCs (Column 3, Panel A). At the same time, the evidence indicates that
these profits rise as a consequence of the scaling up of firms’ overall sales and activity: Once we
control for log firm sales in Column 4 of Panel A, the partial correlation between profits and the span
of production stages is no longer statistically significant. In line with this, the three profitability
ratios (Panels B-D) are not affected by expansions or contractions in UMft −UXft in a robust manner.
As we will see below in the conceptual framework, these patterns are consistent with firm owners
maximizing total profits from operations rather than profit margins per se.
5 Towards a Conceptual Framework
The empirical analysis has uncovered new stylized facts about the joint evolution of Chinese firms’
attributes and their production line position over the firm lifecycle. We propose here a conceptual
framework that can rationalize these facts and give them an internally consistent economic interpre-
tation. We consider a stylized, partial-equilibrium setting, in which the firm takes certain market
conditions as given, such as the price of intermediate goods at different stages of completion. Our
purpose is to highlight in as basic a framework as possible some key trade-offs for understanding a
firm’s span of production stages, that more complete models – incorporating considerations related
for example to market power – can build on in future work.
5.1 Set-up
The production of final goods in any given industry requires the completion of a continuum of stages.
These stages are uniquely sequenced due to technological reasons; for example, the tyres of a car
need to be ready before the rolling chassis can be assembled. We index the production stages by
u ∈ [1,∞), where a higher u refers to a stage that is more upstream and positioned earlier in the
production sequence. In particular, the most upstream stage at the start of the production line is
indexed by u = ∞, while the completed final good is indexed by u = 1. We adopt this convention
to be consistent with the empirical measure of upstreamness in the prior sections.
We consider the decision problem of a firm that is active in one particular industry, over the
41For Panels B-D of Table 10, we exclude observations in the tail 5% of the distribution of total real profits as in
Panel A; we then compute the respective ratios and further drop the tail 1% of observations for each profit margin
measure thereafter.
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measure of production stages to perform. The output of a firm that has chosen its span of production








where 1 ≤ UX < UM and α, ρ ∈ (0, 1). Here, qM is the quantity of the semi-finished good that has
been completed up to stage UM , which the firm purchases as an intermediate input; to be clear,
all stage inputs for u ∈ [UM ,∞) have already been built into this intermediate input when it is
purchased. The production stages from u = UM to u = UX are then performed, with the firm
choosing the quantity x(u) of inputs for each of these stages.42 The output q that the firm generates
is in turn a semi-finished good that has been completed up to stage UX . While the model is agnostic
about where intermediate input qM is purchased from or where output q is sold, it is natural in the
context of China for us to associate UM and UX with the firm-level import and export upstreamness
measures constructed earlier.
In (10), the intermediate input qM and the stage inputs x(u) are combined in a CES manner,
with elasticity of substitution equal to 1/(1−α) > 1.43 The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree
to which the output of the firm is subject to decreasing returns to scale. Given the price-taking
assumptions that we adopt below, ρ needs to be strictly smaller than 1 in order for the size of the
firm to be uniquely pinned down.
The productivity of the firm is given by θ. To fix ideas, one can think of θ as coming from a
productivity draw that the firm receives upon its successful entry into the industry (Melitz 2003),
which reflects the efficiency of its assembly technologies and/or the effectiveness of its management
practices. For our purposes, we will treat θ as a firm-specific attribute and consider comparative
statics with respect to it, to explore how the span of stages the firm performs would respond to
exogenous shocks to its productivity. A richer dynamic framework would seek to model more sys-
tematically the evolution of this productivity over the firm lifecycle, an issue which we abstract from
here. Note that θ can be interpreted alternatively as a quality term, with changes in θ reflecting
shocks to market demand for the firm’s output.
We assume for simplicity that the firm is small within the industry and that it takes prices
as given. There is moreover an open competitive market for semi-finished goods at all stages of
completion u ∈ [1,∞) with price schedule p(u). We posit that p′(u) < 0: the market price of a more
upstream good is lower, as these embody fewer completed production stages. As an example, this
means that there is a market price for the raw rubber needed to manufacture four tyres, and that
this is lower than the purchase price for a set of completed tyres.44
42We have emphasized the sequentiality of the production stages to be in keeping with prior modeling work on
production chains such as Harms et al. (2012), Costinot et al. (2013), and Antràs and Chor (2013). One can, however,
interpret the production function in (10) as one in which all stages u ∈ [UX , UM ] are performed simultaneously by the
firm, such that the insights we derive do not depend crucially on the timing of these production stages.
43This CES formulation of the production function over stage inputs is similar to that in Antràs and Chor (2013)
and Alfaro et al. (2019).
44In practice, some inputs might need to be customized to the specific needs of the firm. Antràs and Chor (2013)
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The firm incurs two costs for each production stage u ∈ [UX , UM ] that it performs: (i) a variable
cost, c(u), per unit of the stage input x(u); and (ii) a per period fixed cost, f(u), which applies as
long as x(u) > 0. One can view c(u) as the cost of labor inputs that are required to produce each
unit of the stage input x(u). In turn, the f(u) can be interpreted as an overhead usage cost of assets
and equipment necessary for the execution of the production stage u.45 For convenience, we will
assume that both c(u) and f(u) are differentiable functions.
The firm’s profit function is thus given by:







this being the revenue from sales of the stage-UX good, less the cost of qM units of the stage-U
M
intermediate input, as well as the variable and fixed costs for the stages u ∈ [UX , UM ]. Given
knowledge of its productivity θ, the firm then chooses: (i) the cut-off stages, UM and UX ; (ii) the
quantity qM of the upstream intermediate input to purchase; and (iii) the quantity of {x(u)}u=U
M
u=UX
for each stage input. These decisions are made to maximize the firm’s profits as specified in (11).
We will focus for simplicity on a situation where the firm’s profit maximization problem yields an
interior solution that yields positive profits.
5.2 Firm behavior
We explore how an increase in a firm’s productivity can impact the optimal span of stages that it
engages in. A shock to θ would lead a profit-maximizing firm to re-evaluate the positions of its cut-
off stages UX and UM , while accordingly adjusting the quantity qM of the upstream intermediate
to procure and the quantities x(u) of stage inputs. We focus on the conditions under which these
firm-level responses would be consistent with the empirical patterns documented in Sections 3 and
4 for the global production line position of Chinese firms.
Holding all else constant, a positive shock to productivity θ would raise the firm’s output and
hence its revenues. In principle, this would make it feasible for the firm to conduct a larger range of
production stages, by purchasing a more upstream intermediate input (i.e., increasing UM ), and/or
by assembling a product that is closer to the final good (i.e., decreasing UX). Intuitively, an increase
in UM would lower the price p(UM ) of the more upstream intermediate input that must be purchased
(since p′(u) < 0), but this needs to be compared against the fixed and variable costs incurred when
the firm takes on responsibility for the inframarginal stages. Similarly, a decrease in UX means that
the firm would be able to fetch a higher price p(UX) for selling a more finished good, but this needs
to be weighed against the additional fixed and variable costs of completing more stages.
The framework in Section 5.1 sheds light on these key trade-offs. The model set-up is fairly
general and can accommodate different shifts in a firm’s production span in response to shocks to
and Alfaro et al. (2019) study the implications of such specificity for production chains under incomplete contracts,
where firm payoffs are pinned down by a bargaining process rather than market prices.
45This could alternatively reflect the per-period amortized sunk costs of the firm.
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its productivity. As should be clear though, what is important is to understand the behavior of the
firm’s revenue and cost structure in the neighborhood of its initial cut-off stages UM and UX . As
we establish in the Theory Appendix, the following condition is sufficient to guarantee that a rise in
firm productivity lead to a widening of the span of production stages performed:














We demonstrate in the Theory Appendix that the first-order conditions associated with the firm’s
profit maximization problem imply the following:
Proposition 1 Under the Sufficient Condition, a positive productivity shock will induce a firm to:
1. expand its span of production stages (d(U
M−UX)
dθ > 0) by purchasing a more upstream interme-
diate input (dU
M




2. use a higher quantity of the upstream input (dqMdθ > 0) and of all stage inputs (
dx(u)
dθ > 0
∀u ∈ [UX , UM ]).
The Sufficient Condition lends itself to an intuitive interpretation. For Proposition 1 to hold, we
require first that the firm’s production function not be subject too strongly to decreasing returns
to scale (condition (i)). This provides a baseline technological reason for a firm that has become
more productive to raise its output, which it can achieve in part by expanding the span of stages it
performs. Put otherwise, this implies complementarity between the scale of the firm and the scope
of production stages it performs. In turn, condition (ii) describes a set of circumstances under which
a more productive firm would find it optimal to purchase a more upstream intermediate input, while
selling output that is more proximate to final demand. This will be the case so long as the firm has
low fixed and variable costs in the neighborhood of its initial upstream cut-off stage UM , relative to
the costs incurred from purchasing the stage-UM good as an intermediate input; this ensures that
the firm would find it feasible to substitute towards performing more of these stages. Proposition 1
likewise requires that the fixed and variable costs associated with the UX cut-off stage be sufficiently
low, relative to the revenues received from selling a stage-UX good, in order to make it profitable to
take on more stages at this margin.
Relationship to Stylized Facts: It is useful to connect Proposition 1 with the empirical
findings reported earlier. First, the predictions for how UX , UM and hence UM −UX each respond
to exogenous increases in firm productivity line up with Firm Fact 1. To the extent that more
productive firms also exhibit a larger volume of total sales and are more likely to survive over time,
the proposition can further rationalize the empirical patterns for firm size and experience and their
strong correlation with the firm-level upstreamness measures.46 In the proof in the Appendix, we
46Appendix Table 1 demonstrates that in our Chinese firm-level data, log productivity and log sales are indeed
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, in the neighborhood of the UX cut-off stage be sufficiently small, this can mute (or even
reverse) the predicted sign of dU
X
dθ , even while retaining the prediction that
dUM
dθ > 0. This would be
consistent with the pattern of results uncovered in Section 4.2.1, where the correlation between firm
productivity and export upstreamness was relatively weak, whereas the positive correlation with
import upstreamness (and hence the span of stages) was especially robust.
Second, Proposition 1 also provides a plausible explanation for the evolution of the overall import
and export upstreamness of China’s trade flows (Macro Trends 1-5 ). Evidence in the prior literature
points to a secular trend in productivity growth among Chinese firms during our sample period (e.g.,
Brandt et al. 2012), which can generate the pattern of a rising UM and a falling UX in the aggregate.47
We derive several additional results from the firm’s profit maximization problem. Notice that
with an increase in firm productivity θ, profits π in (11) would rise even if UX , UM , qM and the x(u)’s
were held fixed at their original values. It follows immediately that the firm’s profits necessarily rise
after taking into account any profit-maximizing adjustments that the firm might make to these key
choice variables.
The solution to the firm’s problem also pins down its input and cost structure. Under the
Sufficient Condition, it is straightforward to see that following an increase in θ, the firm’s total fixed
costs, FC ≡
∫ UM
UX f(u)du, would rise, given that U
M increases and UX decreases. Bearing in mind
that dx(u)dθ > 0, the firm’s total variable costs incurred, V C ≡
∫ UM
UX c(u)x(u)du, would similarly also
increase. We turn next to the firm’s value added, defined as total revenues less intermediate input
purchases, V A ≡ p(UX)q−p(UM )qM . Notice that V A also equals the sum of the firm’s profits, total
fixed costs, and total variable costs. Since these last three terms all increase with firm productivity,
one can conclude that value added also rises.
Lastly, the effect on the total outlay on intermediates, p(UM )qM , is more subtle: With a higher
UM , the market price of the intermediate input is lower since p′(u) < 0, but this also induces the
firm to demand a higher quantity qM of it. We show formally in the Theory Appendix that under
the Sufficient Condition, the latter force dominates and the firm’s total spending on the upstream
input grows.
We summarize these conclusions as:
Proposition 2 Under the Sufficient Condition, a firm that expands its span of production stages,
UM − UX , after a positive productivity shock will also experience:
1. higher profits, π;
2. higher value added, V A;
positively correlated, with the correlation coefficient varying between 0.25 and 0.79, depending on the productivity
measure. The log TFPR LP and log TFPR OP measures also correlate positively with our age proxy for firm experience,
although the magnitude of this correlation is smaller for log TFPR ACF and even negative for the more basic log real
value added per worker measure.
47This steady increase in TFP over time is readily corroborated by the firm-level measures of productivity that we
have constructed and used to establish our Firm Facts.
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3. higher total variable costs, V C;
4. higher total fixed costs, FC; and
5. higher intermediate input purchases, p(UM )qM .
Relationship to Stylized Facts: Proposition 2 helps to rationalize Firm Facts 2-4 as cor-
relations among joint outcomes of the firm’s profit maximization problem. This is in contrast to
Proposition 1, which speaks directly to a causal relationship running from an increase in firm pro-
ductivity to its production line position.
The first result in Proposition 2 – that profits rise when firms choose to span a wider segment of
the production chain – is consistent with Firm Fact 4.48 In turn, the shifts predicted in Proposition
2 are in line with the idea that expanding into more stages is associated with incurring more fixed
costs (Firm Fact 3 ), expanding the use of variable inputs such as intermediates and labor (Firm
Fact 2 ), and adding more value in production (Firm Fact 2 ). While we do not observe this directly
in the data, Firm Facts 2-3 together do suggest that when Chinese firms expand their span of
stages, some of these additional production steps are performed in-house: If they were instead only
substituting foreign suppliers with domestic suppliers, it would be harder to account for the rise in
value added, fixed costs and variable costs within firms. Indeed, in the early years of China’s trade
liberalization, firms in industries that were particularly reliant on imported inputs arguably had few
available substitutes among domestic suppliers to facilitate their manufacturing processes.
We return to an earlier finding from Section 4.3, where in conjunction with Firm Fact 2, we
reported that firms that sport a wider span of stages in their global positioning also appear to
export a greater share of their output, while importing a smaller share of their inputs. The conceptual
framework above does not speak directly to these patterns, as the model has been agnostic about the
locations from which inputs are purchased and to which output is sold. It should be noted though
that these last empirical patterns are not inherently at odds with the underlying structure of the
model. For example, if part of the fixed costs that are incurred are to facilitate exporting to more
destinations, a more productive firm that has a wider span of stages would then be more likely too to
start exporting to additional locations; this could help to rationalize a subsequent rise in this firm’s
export-to-sales ratio. On the other hand, if part of the fixed costs that are incurred are related to
identifying and developing reliable domestic sources of customized inputs, this could explain why
more productive firms that undertake more stages within China are also seeing a decrease in the
share of inputs they import.
In short, this stylized model provides a framework for thinking through the forces that affect a
firm’s span of production stages, associated operations, and performance. It is moreover capable
of generating a pattern of shifts in the production line position of firms’ inputs and output that is
consistent with what we have documented for China during its period of rapid growth.
48Though we have also explored several measures of profitability such as the profit-to-sales ratio in the empirics,
how this measure would shift with an increase in firm productivity is theoretically ambiguous since both profits and
sales would rise. One would need additional assumptions in order to pin down the direction of change.
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6 Conclusion
Global value chains have fundamentally transformed international trade and development in recent
decades. The fragmentation of production across countries has raised important policy questions
about the new challenges and opportunities for individual firms and aggregate economies, amidst
growing concerns about the slow structural transformation in some underdeveloped countries and
the uneven distribution of the gains from trade across nations.
We shed light on these questions by examining how Chinese firms position themselves in global
production lines and how this position evolves with firm productivity and performance over the firm
lifecycle. First, we document that there has been a sharp rise in the upstreamness of imports, a
stable pattern in the upstreamness of exports, and a rapid expansion in production stages conducted
in China over the 1992-2014 period. Second, we show that firms span more production stages as they
grow more productive, bigger and more experienced. This expansion is accompanied by a rise in
value added, input use, fixed assets and profits, even though profit margins are relatively unaffected.
Finally, we illustrate with a stylized model that these patterns can be explained in a production
chain setting that features complementarities between the scope of stages a firm undertakes and the
scale of its production.
Much scope remains for future work on this broad topic. Economic events have moved quickly
in the past five years with the rise in trade tensions between China and the US, as well as the global
slowdown from the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be interesting to track how looming policy actions
that could uncouple cross-border supply chains might affect the GVC positioning of Chinese firms.
Separately, it would be useful to pursue empirical studies beyond China, to document if similar
trends are present for other fast-growing developing countries that have sought to engage in GVCs.
Firm-level datasets that contain more detailed information on the product mix of domestic input
purchases or on the identity of domestic suppliers would be particularly welcome, in order to shed
light on the role that vertical integration might play in influencing a firm’s span of stages.
On the theory side, there is room to consider extensions of our parsimonious model to richer
environments. For example, a consideration of firm dynamics could inform how firms make endoge-
nous decisions to invest in innovation or build up experience that can systematically affect their
productivity, production staging and performance in future periods. A fuller model could seek too
to explore the role of product scope, to understand how adjustments in the set of imported input
varieties and the set of exported products might vary in tandem with decisions over GVC position-
ing. There is potentially more work to be done to accommodate endogenous price setting along
production lines, as well as to distinguish between upstream input sourcing and downstream output
sales at home versus abroad. Such extensions could help to shed more light on the issues of rent
sharing and the distribution of the gains from trade across firm boundaries and country borders.
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Data Appendix
Industry- and Firm-Level Upstreamness: We compute the industry-level upstreamness mea-
sures as described in Section 2.3 using China’s 2007 Input-Output (IO) Tables, for 135 industries.
(This is a distinct industry classification from the GB/T system used in the ASIF.) The IO Tables
facilitate a crosswalk between the IO industries and Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit products for
the 2007 vintage of the HS codes. The trade flows in the Chinese customs data are however recorded
across different years in the 1992, 1996, 2002, 2007 or 2012 HS vintages. (In particular, trade flows
between 1992-1995 are recorded in the 1992 vintage, flows between 1996-2001 are recorded in the
1996 vintage, etc.)
We use publicly-provided correspondences from the UN Statistical Division to establish a map-
ping from different vintages of the HS product codes to the Chinese 2007 IO industries. For each
HS 6-digit product code (in a vintage other than HS 2007), we identify the set of all HS 2007 codes
and hence the set of all Chinese IO industries that it potentially maps to. We then take a weighted-
average value of the associated Chinese IO industry upstreamness values, with weights proportional
to the gross value of output for each industry recorded in the Chinese IO Tables. This yields a
unique upstreamness value for each HS6 code across all vintages. From there, we can compute the
firm-level upstreamness measures as defined in equation (2) in the main paper.
There are a small number of HS6 codes which appear in the Chinese customs data, but not
in the UN correspondence tables. For any such code, we first consider the HS 5-digit category
that it belongs to. We identify all 2007 Chinese IO industries that this HS 5-digit category could
potentially map to, using the cross-vintage correspondence when necessary for non-HS 2007 years;
we then compute a gross-output-weighted upstreamness value for the HS 5-digit category, and assign
this to the missing HS6 code. If the set of 2007 Chinese IO industries that the HS 5-digit category
maps to is an empty set, we then seek to construct a similar weighted-average measure at the HS
4-digit level; we proceed as necessary to higher levels of aggregation with the HS codes until we can
assign the HS6 code with a Chinese IO industry weighted-average upstreamness value. Note that
the value of trade flows that are unmatched after the direct HS 6-digit merge – and thus have to be
assigned an upstreamness value on the basis of a more aggregate HS code – is less than 1% for all
years except 2012-2014, where trade flows are recorded in the HS 2012 vintage. Even for these latter
years, the value of trade flows assigned an upstreamness value on the basis of a more aggregate HS
code is less than 3%.
Classification of trade intermediaries: Trade intermediaries are identified from firm names
recorded in the 2000-2006 CCTS dataset, following the procedure from Ahn et al. (2011). We
assume that any firm identified as an intermediary in 2000-2006 is also an intermediary if it appears
in subsequent years in the CCTS. We lack firm names from 2007 onward to perform this classification
directly for firms that do not appear in the prior 2000-2006 data. While some firms may thus be
inadvertently classified as non-intermediaries in 2007-2014, this is not likely to be overly affecting
our Macro Trends, in particular Macro Trend 5. As reported in Table 4, the within-firm time trends
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in firm-level upstreamness are very similar in Columns 1-2 (where all firms are included) compared
to Columns 3-4 (where the firms classified as intermediaries are dropped).
Firm-Level Measures from the ASIF: We construct real value added as the difference
between output and total intermediate purchases, after deflating by sector-year specific output and
input deflators respectively. All price deflators are from Brandt et al. (2012), and are available at the
GB/T 4-digit industry level. We also follow Brandt et al. (2012)’s procedure – based on the perpetual
inventory method – for constructing a real capital stock series for firms in the ASIF from 1999-2007,
drawing on the investment deflators they provide where necessary. To compute each of the revenue-
based TFP measures, we adopt a production function where capital, labor, and purchased materials
(intermediate inputs) are the inputs in the production function. This is estimated separately by
GB/T 2-digit industry; the Stata routines used are opreg for TFPR OP, levpet for TFPR LP,
and acfest for TFPR ACF. We obtain similar results when estimating the production functions
separately by firm ownership type (SOE, PVT, JV/MNC) within each GB/T 2-digit industry.
Theory Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Recall that the firm’s profit function in (11) is given by:







The firm’s choice variables are: the quantity of the stage-UM intermediate input to purchase, qM ;
the input levels, x(u), for the production stages u ∈ [UX , UM ]; as well as the identities of the cut-off
stages, UX and UM .


























ρ x(UM )α − p′(UM )qM − c(UM )x(UM )− f(UM ) = 0. (15)
Note in particular that (13) holds for all stages u ∈ [UX , UM ]. In what follows, we assume that the
profit-maximizing outcome is an interior solution.
In order to understand how the firm’s choice over the span of production stages is affected by θ,















































Note that dx(u)x(u) −
dqM
qM
< 0 if dUM > 0, since p′(u) < 0. Holding all else constant, shifting the UM
cut-off stage upstream results in a lower price p(UM ) relative to c(u), and hence in an increase in
the use of the stage-UM intermediate input relative to stage inputs x(u).


































, for both u = UX and u = UM . (20)








c(UM )x(UM )− f(UM ). (22)
These last three expressions, (20), (21) and (22), that hold at any profit-maximizing outcome by the
firm are useful substitutions to bear in mind. In particular, our baseline assumption that p′(u) < 0
implies that 1−αα c(u)x(u) − f(u) < 0 is necessarily satisfied at u = U
X and u = UM if such an
interior solution to the firm’s profit maximization problem is to exist.
Making use of (20), (21) and (22), as well as the expression for dx(u)x(u) from (18), one can simplify
























We will later substitute this expression for dqq into equation (16).




















+ c(UM )x(UM )dx(U
M )
x(UM )
+ [p′′(UM )qM + c′(UM )x(UM ) + f ′(UM )]dUM
p′(UM )qM + c(UM )x(UM ) + f(UM )
.(24)
Using (17), one can see that the left-hand side of (24) is exactly equal to dx(U
M )
x(UM )


















where ΦM ≡ p′′(UM )qM + c′(UM )x(UM ) + f ′(UM ). This last equation directly relates dqMqM to dU
M .













We now substitute dqMqM from (25) and
dq
q from (23) into (16). Making use of (21) and (22) to
simplify the resulting expressions, one obtains:
dθ
θ








































+ [p′′(UX)q + c′(UX)x(UX) + f ′(UX)]dUX
p′(UX)q + c(UX)x(UX) + f(UX)
. (30)
We simplify this in a manner analogous to (24), by recognizing that the left-hand side is equal to
dx(UX)
x(UX)
. After further replacing dqq on the right-hand side with the corresponding expression from
(23) and simplifying, one arrives at:
dθ
θ
























Note that: ΦX ≡ p′′(UX)q + c′(UX)x(UX) + f ′(UX).
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As a first step towards signing A−C, D−B, and AD−BC, we make reference to the second-order
necessary conditions for UX and UM : The second-derivative of the profit function with respect to
UX and separately with respect to UM each need to be negative when evaluated at the local turning
point in order to ascertain that we have a local maxima. (More formally, for the Hessian matrix to be
negative semi-definite, its diagonal entries each need to be negative.) Differentiating the left-hand
side of (14) with respect to UX and the left-hand side of (15) with respect to UM , and making






















In other words, ΦM and Φ
X
p′(UX)q
need to be bounded from below. Note that both of these lower




















are small does not per se impose restrictions on the behavior of p′′, c′ and f ′. With this
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are sufficiently small, at least relative to Φ
M
p(UM )qM










are small does not by
itself impose restrictions on the behavior of ΦM = p′′(UM ) + c′(UM )x(UM ) + f ′(UM ).) Bearing in
mind that p′(UM ) < 0 in the denominator of the first-term on the right-hand side of (37), it follows






being sufficiently small, one has that
A and E are small too. An assumption that f(U
M )
p(UM )qM




(since p(UM )qM ≤ p(UX)q, if the firm is to operate with non-negative profits); the magnitude of the










are sufficiently small; this implies 1x(u)
dx(u)
dUM
> 0. It follows that the sign of the entire








With AD − BC > 0, A − C > 0 and D − B < 0, (34) and (35) then imply that dUMdθ > 0 and
dUX





> 0, we have: dx(u)dθ > 0. Last but not least, since Φ
M > 0, one
can see from (25) that dqMdθ > 0. This establishes both parts of Proposition 1.







sufficiently small, while maintaining this assumption on the fixed and variable costs in the neigh-






remain small, based on the arguments laid out above,
we would continue to have D − B < 0 and 1x(u)
dx(u)
dUM
> 0. Focusing first on the expression for
A − C in (36), notice that if α is particularly small and c(U
X)x(UX)
p(UX)q







would come to dominate the sign of A − C; we would thus have A − C < 0.
Turning to AD − BC, notice that the terms on the second line of (38) will remain small, given the






are small (since p(UM )qM ≤ p(UX)q). As for













which will remain sufficiently small given that f(U
M )
p(UX)q
is small. It follows that AD−BC will inherit













. As we have just seen when
signing A− C, if α is sufficiently small and c(U
X)x(UX)
p(UX)q
is sufficiently large, this last expression will
be negative, so that AD −BC < 0.
Summing up, when the fixed and variables costs about the UX cut-off are not required to be
small, it is possible that we have: AD−BC < 0, A−C < 0 and D−B < 0, which implies dUMdθ > 0
and dU
X
dθ > 0. In other words, the response of the U
X cut-off to a firm productivity improvement
can be reversed, even while maintaining the direction in which the upstream UM cut-off shifts.
43
Proof of Proposition 2: As discussed in the main text, a firm’s profits will strictly increase after
a positive shock to θ if it were to leave UX , UM , qM and all the x(u)’s unchanged at their initial
values. It follows from a revealed preference argument that the profits of the firm must strictly
increase after any further adjustments in its choice variables are made.
Under the sufficient conditions for Proposition 1 to hold, dU
M
dθ > 0 and
dUX
dθ < 0 together mean
that the firm’s total fixed costs, FC ≡
∫ UM
UX f(u)du would increase. This is simply because fixed
costs are being incurred for a wider span of production stages. Since we also have dx(u)dθ > 0, it
further follows that the firm’s total variable costs V C ≡
∫ UM
UX c(u)x(u)du would increase. The firm’s
value added, V A ≡ p(UX)q − p(UM )qM , is equal to its profits plus total fixed costs, FC, and total
variable costs, V C, incurred. Since each of these three prior variables rises in response to an increase
in productivity, the firm’s value added also rises.



























where we have made use of (22), (25), and (26) to obtain this last expression. Recall from the proof
of Proposition 1 that 1x(u)
dx(u)
dθ > 0 when the Sufficient Condition holds. Recall also that p
′(UM ) < 0.
We therefore have that p′(UM )qM increases when θ rises.
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N Mean St Dev N Mean St Dev N Mean St Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: CCTS trade statistics
All Traders
Log Imports 1,628,806  12.05 2.96
Log Exports 2,385,331  13.15 2.33
Import upstreamness (UM) 1,628,806  3.60 0.83
Export upstreamness (UX) 2,385,331  3.29 0.78
Two-way Traders
Log Imports 1,060,154  12.19 3.03 173,951     12.85 2.82
Log Exports 1,060,154  13.77 2.39 173,951     14.13 2.12
Import upstreamness (UM) 1,060,154  3.68 0.76 173,951     3.70 0.75
Export upstreamness (UX) 1,060,154  3.25 0.77 173,951     3.24 0.79
Import-Export Upstreamness (UM - U
X) 1,060,154  0.42 0.89 173,951     0.46 0.89
Non-Ordinary Imports / Total Imports 1,060,154  0.55 0.46 173,951     0.71 0.41
Non-Ordinary Exports / Total Exports 1,060,154  0.39 0.45 173,951     0.52 0.44
Processing Imports / Total Imports --- --- --- 173,951     0.59 0.44
Processing Exports / Total Exports --- --- --- 173,951     0.52 0.44
Private Domestic Firm (PVT) 1,060,154  0.31 0.46 173,951     0.14 0.35
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 1,060,154  0.05 0.21 173,951     0.05 0.23
Joint Venture (JV) 1,060,154  0.20 0.40 173,951     0.35 0.48
Foreign-Owned MNC Affiliate (MNC) 1,060,154  0.44 0.50 173,951     0.46 0.50
Panel B: ASIF production statistics
Log Real Total Sales 1,703,955  9.90 1.35 171,325     10.78 1.41
Log Employment 1,875,361  4.72 1.15 173,951     5.49 1.17
Log Total Assets 1,871,630  9.64 1.43 173,875     10.66 1.48
Cap. intensity (Log net fixed assets / worker) 1,859,593  3.51 1.36 173,415     3.73 1.43
Skill intensity (Log average wage) 1,862,573  2.32 0.72 173,714     2.66 0.65
Log Real VA per Worker 1,612,143  3.94 1.29 165,955     4.04 1.21
Log TFPR OP 1,266,402  0.77 0.87 154,936     1.04 0.83
Log TFPR LP 1,641,138  4.30 1.23 154,936     7.16 1.39
Log TFPR ACF 1,266,402  3.47 1.43 154,936     3.62 1.27
Log (Age+1) 1,867,812  2.01 0.89 173,675     2.03 0.67
Log Real Value Added 1,612,143  8.66 1.51 165,955     9.54 1.54
Log Real Total Inputs 1,703,762  9.54 1.38 171,252     10.40 1.45
Net Fixed Assets / Total Assets 1,871,630  0.33 2.17 173,875     0.31 0.21
Inventories / Total Assets 1,871,630  0.19 0.17 173,875     0.21 0.16
Profits (Real) 1,717,353  3193.09 49029.37 171,487     10196.97 119999.19
Profits / Sales 1,703,955  0.05 2.33 171,325     0.07 5.32
Table 1: Firm-Level Production and Trade Activity, Summary Statistics
ASIF-CCTS 2000-2006
Notes: Summary statistics are reported separately for the full CCTS 2000-2014 panel of non-intermediary firm-years (Columns 1-3); the full ASIF 1999-2007 panel of firms
(Columns 4-6); and the baseline matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports (Columns 7-9). All
variables are as defined in the text.
ASIF 1999-2007CCTS 2000-2014




25th Median 75th Mean St Dev
Panel A:  Industry upstreamness
2.343 3.060 3.950 3.161 1.118
3.331 4.343 5.345 4.302 1.176
2.498 3.060 4.104 3.276 1.008
1.720 2.966 3.480 2.691 1.076
Nonferrous metal mining industry (IO9) 5.861
Oil & gas exploration industry (IO7) 5.508
Basic chemical raw materials manufacturing (IO39) 5.375
Coal mining & washing industry (IO6) 5.345
Scrap waste (IO91) 5.256
Chemical fiber manufacturing (IO47) 5.162
Ferrous metal mining industry (IO8) 5.114
Coking (IO38) 5.095
Pipeline transportation (IO101) 5.023
Nonferrous metal alloying & smelting (IO61) 4.877
---
Resident services (IO124) 1.382
Software industry (IO107) 1.275
Convenience food manufacturing (IO18) 1.269
Health (IO127) 1.269
Education (IO126) 1.212
Public facilities management (IO123) 1.074
Sports (IO133) 1.060
Construction (IO95) 1.058
Public administration & social organizations (IO135) 1.026
Social welfare (IO129) 1.000
Panel B:  Ten most and least upstream industries
Notes: Computed from Chinese Input-Output Tables for 2007.
Table 2: Industry-Level Upstreamness, 2007 IO Tables
All 135 industries
   Primary (IO industries: 1 to 10)
   Manufacturing (IO industries: 11 to 91)
   Services (IO industries: 92 to 135)
From:      
Firm Entry











2000-2006: 1.220 -0.486 0.734 0.190 -0.788 -0.597 0.137
2006-2014: 1.368 -0.856 0.512 0.094 -0.524 -0.430 0.082
Exports
2000-2006: 1.189 -0.402 0.787 -0.009 -0.793 -0.802 -0.015
2006-2014: 1.622 -0.894 0.727 -0.022 -0.732 -0.754 -0.026
Notes: Based on the exact decomposition of changes in aggregate upstreamness, presented in equation (5). The "net" extensive 
margin column sums up the contributions from firm entry and firm exit in the preceding two columns. The "net" intensive margin is 
the sum of the contributions in the preceding two columns stemming from: (i) changes in firm-level upstreamness, holding constant 
initial firm trade share weights; and (ii) changes in the firm trade share weights, holding constant firm-level upstreamness.  The 
"Overall change" column is the sum of the net extensive and net intensive margin contributions. 
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 3.4602*** 3.3053*** 3.4209*** 3.2981*** 3.5512*** 3.2522*** 0.2990***
Year 2001 -0.0025 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0004
Year 2002 0.0053 -0.0005 0.0114*** 0.0020 0.0032 0.0013 0.0019
Year 2003 0.0476*** -0.0027 0.0603*** 0.0009 0.0332*** -0.0004 0.0337***
Year 2004 0.0842*** -0.0019 0.0967*** -0.0010 0.0617*** -0.0018 0.0635***
Year 2005 0.1237*** -0.0028 0.1408*** -0.0018 0.0898*** -0.0043* 0.0940***
Year 2006 0.1454*** -0.0091*** 0.1680*** -0.0044** 0.1088*** -0.0045* 0.1133***
Year 2007 0.1864*** -0.0103*** 0.2161*** -0.0101*** 0.1526*** -0.0004 0.1530***
Year 2008 0.2028*** -0.0168*** 0.2382*** -0.0162*** 0.1708*** -0.0098*** 0.1806***
Year 2009 0.2225*** -0.0161*** 0.2626*** -0.0151*** 0.1902*** -0.0086*** 0.1987***
Year 2010 0.2151*** -0.0155*** 0.2566*** -0.0146*** 0.1809*** -0.0044 0.1853***
Year 2011 0.2151*** -0.0132*** 0.2578*** -0.0124*** 0.1798*** -0.0034 0.1832***
Year 2012 0.2360*** -0.0082*** 0.2807*** -0.0065*** 0.1924*** 0.0021 0.1904***
Year 2013 0.2400*** -0.0073*** 0.2862*** -0.0061*** 0.1963*** 0.0037 0.1926***
Year 2014 0.2414*** -0.0111*** 0.2876*** -0.0102*** 0.1992*** 0.0001 0.1991***
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1,705,235 2,575,655 1,491,871 2,269,604 982,737 982,737 982,737
R2 0.7328 0.8798 0.7432 0.8931 0.7163 0.9029 0.7276
Table 4: Chinese Firms' Global Production Line Position over Time
Notes: The sample comprises different subsets of firm-year observations in the 2000-2014 CCTS panel; the "Two-
Way Non-intermediaries" subsample in Columns 5-7 comprises all non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the
firm both imports and exports. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm; these
are not reported in the table for brevity (available on request). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity 0.0117*** 0.0003 0.0114*** 0.0117*** 0.0069** 0.0001 0.0067** 0.0069**




Capital Intensity -0.0114*** 0.0023* -0.0138*** -0.0115*** -0.0088*** 0.0014 -0.0102*** -0.0089***
[0.0025] [0.0013] [0.0029] [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0027]
Skill Intensity 0.0063** -0.0005 0.0068* 0.0063** 0.0092*** -0.0015 0.0107*** 0.0093***
[0.0032] [0.0016] [0.0036] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0038] [0.0034]
N 145,534 145,534 145,534 145,534 134,817 134,817 134,817 134,817















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity 0.0135*** -0.0003 0.0138*** 0.0135*** 0.0090*** -0.0001 0.0091*** 0.0090***




Capital Intensity -0.0066** 0.0012 -0.0078** -0.0067** -0.0088*** 0.0013 -0.0101*** -0.0088***
[0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0030] [0.0027]
Skill Intensity 0.0065* -0.0013 0.0078** 0.0066* 0.0068** -0.0008 0.0076** 0.0069**
[0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0038] [0.0034]
N 134,434 134,434 134,434 134,434 135,334 135,334 135,334 135,334
R2 0.7978 0.9632 0.8312 0.8584 0.7977 0.9632 0.8315 0.8589
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel
heading; for each productivity measure, observations with productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th
percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-level measures of capital and skill
intensity. 
Panel C: Log TFPR Levinsohn-Petrin Panel D: Log TFPR Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer
Table 5: Firm Productivity and Global Production Line Position















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Size 0.0293*** -0.0042** 0.0335*** 0.0295*** 0.0260*** -0.0038 0.0298*** 0.0262***




Capital Intensity -0.0094*** 0.0016 -0.0109*** -0.0094*** -0.0039 0.0015 -0.0054* -0.0040
[0.0024] [0.0012] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0014] [0.0029] [0.0026]
Skill Intensity 0.0069** 0.0001 0.0068** 0.0069** 0.0132*** -0.0001 0.0133*** 0.0132***
[0.0030] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0031] [0.0016] [0.0034] [0.0031]
N 152,917 152,917 152,917 152,917 153,426 153,426 153,426 153,426















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience 0.1802*** -0.0082 0.1884*** 0.1806*** 0.0207*** -0.0028** 0.0235*** 0.0209***
[0.0126] [0.0061] [0.0140] [0.0126] [0.0030] [0.0014] [0.0033] [0.0030]
Experience -0.0044 -0.0046* 0.0003 -0.0041




Capital Intensity -0.0125*** 0.0018 -0.0142*** -0.0125*** -0.0097*** 0.0026* -0.0123*** -0.0099***
[0.0024] [0.0012] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0014] [0.0032] [0.0029]
Skill Intensity 0.0062** 0.0001 0.0061* 0.0062** 0.0037 0.0008 0.0028 0.0036
[0.0029] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0029] [0.0036] [0.0017] [0.0039] [0.0036]
N 156,358 156,358 156,358 156,358 109,803 109,803 109,803 109,803
R2 0.7897 0.9592 0.8235 0.8532 0.8089 0.9692 0.8443 0.8667
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm size or experience measure indicated in
the panel heading; for each panel, observations where the size/experience measure is smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than
the 99th percentile are dropped. In Panel D, the "Censored" indicator variable is equal to 1 if the firm reports positive exports in
2000, so that its cumulative exports are potentially left-censored due to the lack of firm-level export data pre-2000. Standard errors
are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and
industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-level measures of capital and skill intensity. 
Table 6: Firm Size, Experience and Global Production Line Position
Panel A: Log Sales Panel B: Log Employment
Panel C: Log (Age+1) Panel D: Log Cumulative Past Exports
Productivity:













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Export IV 0.0127*** 0.0050*
[0.0034] [0.0029]
Productivity 0.6406** -0.0769 0.7174** 0.6449** 1.7099 -0.1403 1.8502 1.7145




N 80,693 80,693 80,693 80,693 80,693 77,681 77,681 77,681 77,681 77,681
R2 0.8679 0.7055 0.9737 0.7554 0.7947 0.7336 0.1324 0.9721 0.2925 0.3922
F-stat 14.19 14.19 14.19 14.21 2.908 2.908 2.908 2.923
Productivity:













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Export IV 0.0481*** 0.0141***
[0.0036] [0.0035]
Productivity 0.1743*** -0.0223 0.1966*** 0.1756*** 0.6564*** -0.0782 0.7345** 0.6605***




N 77,144 77,144 77,144 77,144 77,144 78,018 78,018 78,018 78,018 78,018
R2 0.9013 0.8231 0.9762 0.8578 0.8769 0.8783 0.6977 0.9748 0.7498 0.7899
F-stat 175.0 175.0 175.0 175.0 16.34 16.34 16.34 16.36
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K and H intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 7: Firm Productivity, IV Evidence
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports.
Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel heading; for each productivity measure, observations
with productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. The IV is a firm-level predicted log export variable for year t
constructed from: (i) observed rest-of-the-world export shocks (less exports from China) broken down by destination country and product between year t-1 and 
t ; (ii) each firm's country-product export shares in the first year in which they record exports; and (iii) lag firm-level exports in year t-1 . Standard errors are
clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as
well as the firm-level measures of capital and skill intensity. 
Panel A: Log real VA per worker Panel B: Log TFPR Olley-Pakes
Panel C: Log TFPR Levinsohn-Petrin Panel D: Log TFPR Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer
Dep variable:









X 0.0309*** 0.0009 0.0288*** -0.0013
[0.0045] [0.0030] [0.0036] [0.0016]
Log Real Sales 0.9619*** 0.9229***
[0.0040] [0.0030]
N 145,216 145,216 145,216 144,131 150,286 150,286 150,286 149,266
R2 0.8769 0.8769 0.8769 0.9357 0.9104 0.9103 0.9104 0.9760
Dep variable:









X 0.0307*** 0.0049 -7.1574*** -6.3846***
[0.0051] [0.0043] [0.3179] [0.3109]
Log Real Sales 0.7141*** -21.4526***
[0.0072] [0.6373]
N 153,286 153,286 153,286 148,591 153,006 153,006 153,006 147,326
R2 0.9393 0.9393 0.9393 0.9541 0.7437 0.7424 0.7436 0.7589
Dep variable:











Log Real Sales -16.4699***
[0.4189]
N 152,208 152,208 152,208 146,769
R2 0.8309 0.8308 0.8309 0.8456
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K & H Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both
imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using a different measure of firm inputs and value added, as
indicated in the panel heading; for each firm input/value added measure, observations smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than
the 99th percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-level measures of capital and skill
intensity. 
Table 8: Firm Global Production Line Position, Inputs and Value Added
Panel A: Log Real Value Added Panel B: Log Real Total Inputs
Panel E: Exports / Total Sales
Panel D: Imports / Total InputsPanel C: Log Wagebill
Dep variable:









X 0.0145*** 0.0025 0.0036*** 0.0037***
[0.0026] [0.0022] [0.0006] [0.0006]
Log Real Sales 0.3573*** -0.0076***
[0.0037] [0.0009]
N 153,323 153,323 153,323 148,516 153,951 153,951 153,951 148,110
R2 0.9721 0.9721 0.9721 0.9790 0.8549 0.8548 0.8549 0.8570
Dep variable:









X 0.0244*** 0.0111** 0.0033*** 0.0033***
[0.0049] [0.0048] [0.0006] [0.0006]
Log Real Sales 0.3838*** -0.0009
[0.0072] [0.0009]
N 148,932 148,932 148,932 144,640 154,483 154,483 154,483 148,581
R2 0.8742 0.8742 0.8742 0.8811 0.7154 0.7153 0.7154 0.7183
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K & H Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using a different measure of firm assets or inventories,
as indicated in the panel heading; for each firm asset/inventory measure, observations smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than
the 99th percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-level measures of capital and skill
intensity. 
Table 9: Firm Global Production Line Position, Assets and Cost Structure
Panel A: Log Fixed Assets Panel B: Fixed Assets / Total Assets
Panel C: Log Inventories Panel D: Inventories / Total Assets
Dep variable:









X 101.88*** 21.42 0.0000 -0.0003
[29.88] [28.08] [0.0003] [0.0003]
Log Real Sales 2,882.86*** 0.0096***
[39.37] [0.0004]
N 133,167 133,167 133,167 131,802 131,557 131,557 131,557 130,353
R2 0.7262 0.7261 0.7262 0.7553 0.6535 0.6535 0.6535 0.6587
Dep variable:









X -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0010* -0.0000
[0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Log Real Sales 0.0369*** 0.0391***
[0.0016] [0.0007]
N 127,558 127,558 127,558 126,610 131,948 131,948 131,948 130,589
R2 0.5947 0.5947 0.5947 0.5993 0.6347 0.6347 0.6347 0.6568
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K & H Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using a different profit measure, as indicated in the panel
heading. In Panel A, observations where profits are smaller than the 5th percentile and larger than the 95th percentile are dropped;
in subsequent panels, we further drop observations smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile of the respective
profitability ratio. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-level measures of capital and skill intensity. 
Table 10: Firm Global Production Line Position and Profitability
Panel A: Profits Panel B: Profits / Sales
Panel C: Profits / Value Added Panel D: Profits / Assets
Figure 1 
Trends in China’s Aggregate Trade and Global Production Line Position 
 
 
A: Import and Export Upstreamness 
 
 





Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics; aggregates are based on data at the province or city level for 1992-1999 and data at the 
firm level for 2000-2014. Information on China’s GDP used in Panel B is from the World Development Indicators.     
Figure 2 
Trends in Aggregate Upstreamness by Customs Trade Regime 
 
 








Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics; aggregates are based on the trade regime status of each trade transaction. Non-ordinary 





Trends in Aggregate Upstreamness by Firm Ownership Type 
 
  
A: All HS products 
 
 




Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Ownership type is deduced from the sixth digit of CCTS firm codes: “SOE” = state-owned 
enterprises, “PVT/OTH” = private and all other enterprises, “JV/MNC” = joint venture and multinational companies.  
Figure 4 





Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Kernel density plots of the difference 
between import and export upstreamness at the firm level. The sample comprises 5,646 “survivor” firms that export 
and import in each year in 2000-2014, and 26,450 “new” two-way traders that reported export and import activity in 





















Log TFPR OP 0.58 1.00
Log TFPR LP 0.75 0.57 1.00
Log TFPR ACF 0.68 0.39 0.52 1.00
Log Sales 0.50 0.25 0.79 0.37 1.00
Log Employment -0.17 0.13 0.45 -0.10 0.67 1.00
Log (Age+1) -0.01 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.22 0.28 1.00
Log Cum Past Exports 0.05 0.13 0.27 0.09 0.38 0.42 0.16 1.00
Appendix Table 1: Productivity, Size and Experience Correlations
Notes: This table reports two-way correlations among firm characteristics in the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-
intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports.






310410 Fertilizers: Carnallite, sylvite and other crude natural potassium salts 4.565 270.80
711292 Waste & scrap of platinum 5.256 219.43
070390 Leeks & other alliaceous vegetables, fresh/chilled 3.331 172.86
310560 Mineral/chemical fertilizers containing phosphorus & potassium 4.565 169.53
811010 Unwrought antimony; powders 4.877 168.82
100810 Buckwheat 3.331 166.40
310240 Mixtures of ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate etc. for use as fertilizers 4.565 166.05
530810 Coir yarn 4.237 164.42
271114 Ethylene, propylene, butylene & butadiene, liquefied 5.375 159.99
360100 Propellent powders 4.863 156.87
310270 Calcium cyanamide 4.565 155.81
121291 Sugar beet, fresh/chilled/frozen/dried, whether or not ground 3.331 155.49
470419 Chemical wood pulp, sulphite, other than dissolving grades etc. 4.354 154.43
910199 Pocket-watches & other watches (excl. wrist-watches), etc. 3.666 153.93
271111 Natural gas, liquefied 5.508 152.25
780200 Lead waste & scrap 5.256 148.90
630631 Sails for boats/sailboards/landcraft, of synthetic fibers 4.010 145.02
720230 Ferro-silico-manganese, in granular/powder form 4.653 142.24
722720 Bars & rods, hot-rolled, in irregularly wound coils, of silico-manganese steel 3.665 136.89
261100 Tungsten ores & concentrates 5.861 135.66
Appendix Table 2: Upstream Products with Largest Import Growth Rates (2002-2006)








Log # Import Products -0.0257*** -0.0303***
[0.0012] [0.0014]
Log # Export Products -0.0053*** 0.0468***
[0.0010] [0.0015]
Constant 3.6123*** 3.2596*** 0.3056***
Year, 2001 -0.0036 -0.0007 -0.0024
Year, 2002 -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0026
Year, 2003 0.0280*** -0.0002 0.0254***
Year, 2004 0.0552*** -0.0013 0.0516***
Year, 2005 0.0817*** -0.0034 0.0772***
Year, 2006 0.0985*** -0.0035 0.0920***
Year, 2007 0.1408*** 0.0007 0.1293***
Year, 2008 0.1576*** -0.0086*** 0.1549***
Year, 2009 0.1748*** -0.0073*** 0.1699***
Year, 2010 0.1670*** -0.0029 0.1556***
Year, 2011 0.1657*** -0.0017 0.1520***
Year, 2012 0.1775*** 0.0039 0.1564***
Year, 2013 0.1809*** 0.0057** 0.1562***
Year, 2014 0.1840*** 0.0026 0.1594***
Firm FE Y Y Y
N 982,737 982,737 982,737
R2 0.7167 0.9029 0.7285
Notes: The sample comprises all non-intermediary firms in the 2000-2014 CCTS
panel, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm; these are not
reported in the table for the year fixed effects for brevity (available on request). ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Appendix Table 3: Firms' Product Scope















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Size / Exper.: 0.0209*** -0.0084*** 0.0293*** 0.0214*** 0.1828*** -0.0133** 0.1961*** 0.1835***




Capital Intensity -0.0096*** 0.0018 -0.0114*** -0.0097*** -0.0110*** 0.0017 -0.0128*** -0.0111***
[0.0024] [0.0012] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0012] [0.0026] [0.0023]
Skill Intensity 0.0087*** 0.0008 0.0080** 0.0087*** 0.0099*** 0.0001 0.0098*** 0.0099***
[0.0030] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0029]
N 152,287 152,287 152,287 152,287 156,587 156,587 156,587 156,587
R2 0.7890 0.9619 0.8251 0.8525 0.7900 0.9592 0.8238 0.8534
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Appendix Table 4: Additional Firm Size and Experience Measures
Panel A: Log Exports Panel B: Log Processing Exports
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm size or experience measure indicated in
the panel heading; for each panel, observations where the size/experience measure is smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than
the 99th percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign-owned 0.0136*** 0.0004 0.0131*** 0.0135*** 0.0081*** 0.0003 0.0078** 0.0081***
   × Productivity [0.0025] [0.0013] [0.0028] [0.0025] [0.0029] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0029]
Private-owned 0.0097 -0.0064* 0.0162* 0.0101 0.0067 -0.0039 0.0107 0.0069
   × Productivity [0.0088] [0.0038] [0.0094] [0.0087] [0.0114] [0.0046] [0.0120] [0.0114]
State-owned -0.0241* 0.0126* -0.0367** -0.0248* -0.0203 0.0053 -0.0256 -0.0205




N 145,534 145,534 145,534 145,534 134,817 134,817 134,817 134,817















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign-owned 0.0165*** -0.0003 0.0168*** 0.0165*** 0.0105*** 0.0001 0.0104*** 0.0105***
   × Productivity [0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0013] [0.0029] [0.0026]
Private-owned -0.0008 -0.0032 0.0024 -0.0007 0.0073 -0.0053 0.0127 0.0075
   × Productivity [0.0089] [0.0037] [0.0096] [0.0089] [0.0090] [0.0038] [0.0097] [0.0090]
State-owned -0.0170 0.0079 -0.0249 -0.0173 -0.0188 0.0092 -0.0280* -0.0192




N 134,434 134,434 134,434 134,434 135,334 135,334 135,334 135,334
R2 0.7979 0.9632 0.8313 0.8584 0.7977 0.9632 0.8315 0.8589
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K and H intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel
heading; for each productivity measure, observations with productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th
percentile are dropped. The effects of productivity across three ownership types -- foreign-owned (JV/MNC), private-owned (PVT),
state-owned (SOE) -- are jointly estimated through interaction terms between productivity and the respective ownership type dummy;
the level effects of the ownership dummies are absorbed by the firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well
as the firm-level measures of capital and skill intensity. 
Appendix Table 5: The Effect of Firm Productivity by Firm Ownership
Panel A: Log real VA per worker Panel B: Log TFPR Olley-Pakes















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity 0.0134*** 0.0212*** -0.0078** 0.0106*** -0.0055 -0.0087*** 0.0032 -0.0044




Capital Intensity -0.0168*** 0.0257*** -0.0425*** -0.0202*** -0.0150*** 0.0289*** -0.0439*** -0.0186***
[0.0024] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0024]
Skill Intensity -0.0123*** -0.0050 -0.0073 -0.0117*** -0.0039 0.0038 -0.0077 -0.0044
[0.0041] [0.0037] [0.0052] [0.0041] [0.0043] [0.0037] [0.0054] [0.0043]
N 153,744 153,744 153,744 153,744 143,070 143,070 143,070 143,070















(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity -0.0028 -0.0037 0.0009 -0.0023 0.0098*** 0.0195*** -0.0097*** 0.0073**




Capital Intensity -0.0147*** 0.0284*** -0.0431*** -0.0183*** -0.0149*** 0.0281*** -0.0430*** -0.0185***
[0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0024]
Skill Intensity -0.0033 0.0041 -0.0074 -0.0038 -0.0093** -0.0054 -0.0039 -0.0087**
[0.0043] [0.0038] [0.0054] [0.0043] [0.0044] [0.0038] [0.0055] [0.0043]
N 142,709 142,709 142,709 142,709 143,581 143,581 143,581 143,581
R2 0.5427 0.7734 0.5477 0.6833 0.5414 0.7725 0.5471 0.6835
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-by-city-
by-ownership FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm
both imports and exports. Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel
heading; for each productivity measure, observations with productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th
percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. All columns include four-digit-industry-by-city-by-ownership-type and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-
level measures of capital and skill intensity; three firm ownership categories are considered in the industry-by-city-by-ownership fixed
effects: foreign-owned (JV/MNC), private-owned (PVT), and state-owned (SOE).
Appendix Table 6: The Effect of Firm Productivity, Cross-Firm Specification
Panel A: Log real VA per worker Panel B: Log TFPR Olley-Pakes
Panel C: Log TFPR Levinsohn-Petrin Panel D: Log TFPR Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer
Size:













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Export IV 0.0765*** 0.0570***
[0.0029] [0.0022]
Size 0.0941*** -0.0128 0.1069*** 0.0948*** 0.1352*** -0.0149 0.1501*** 0.1360***




N 83,819 83,819 83,819 83,819 83,819 83,953 83,953 83,953 83,953 83,953
R2 0.9504 0.8253 0.9748 0.8603 0.8791 0.9593 0.8253 0.9747 0.8595 0.8787
F-stat 687.6 687.6 687.6 688.1 659.8 659.8 659.8 659.9
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K and H intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Appendix Table 7: Firm Size, IV Evidence
Panel A: Log Sales Panel B: Log Employment
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports.
Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm size measure indicated in the panel heading; for each size measure, observations with size
smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. The IV is a firm-level predicted log export variable for year t , constructed from: (i)
observed rest-of-the-world export shocks (less exports from China) broken down by destination country and product between year t-1 and t ; (ii) each firm's
country-product export shares in the first year in which they record exports; and (iii) lag firm-level exports in year t-1 . Standard errors are clustered by firm; ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-level
measures of capital and skill intensity. 
Productivity:













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Import IV 0.0098*** 0.0029
[0.0024] [0.0021]
Productivity 1.9275*** -0.0186 1.9461*** 1.9275*** 6.2947 -0.1536 6.4484 6.2742




N 78,839 78,839 78,839 78,839 78,839 75,897 75,897 75,897 75,897 75,897
R2 0.8694 -0.3559 0.9721 0.0107 0.0514 0.7320 -9.2116 0.9681 -6.5817 -6.1542
F-stat 16.39 16.39 16.39 16.41 1.913 1.913 1.913 1.932
Productivity:













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Import IV 0.0328*** 0.0120***
[0.0026] [0.0025]
Productivity 0.5721*** -0.0097 0.5818*** 0.5724*** 1.6163*** -0.0059 1.6222*** 1.6164***




N 75,323 75,323 75,323 75,323 75,323 76,358 76,358 76,358 76,358 76,358
R2 0.9009 0.7466 0.9735 0.7979 0.8220 0.8756 -0.0177 0.9735 0.2622 0.2889
F-stat 164.2 164.2 164.2 164.4 22.25 22.25 22.25 22.26
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K and H intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000-2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports.
Each panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel heading; for each productivity measure, observations
with productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. The IV is a firm-level predicted log import variable for year t
constructed from: (i) observed rest-of-the-world import shocks (less imports by China) broken down by origin country and product between year t-1 and t ; (ii)
each firm's country-product import shares in the first year in which they record imports; and (iii) lag firm-level imports in year t-1 . Standard errors are clustered by
firm; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, as well as the firm-
level measures of capital and skill intensity. 
Appendix Table 8: Firm Productivity, Import IV
Panel A: Log real VA per worker Panel B: Log TFPR Olley-Pakes
Panel C: Log TFPR Levinsohn-Petrin Panel D: Log TFPR Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer
Appendix Figure 1 
Trends in Aggregate Upstreamness: Alternative Constructions 
 
     A: Manufacturing only (Chinese 2007 IO industry 11-91) 
 
 
     B: Excluding Mineral Products (HS 25-27) 
 
 
     C: Excluding Capital Goods (UN BEC) 
 
 
     D: Industry Upstreamness from US 2002 IO Tables 
 
 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Panel A uses only HS products that map to manufacturing industries in the Chinese 
2007 Input-Output Tables in the construction of the weighted-average import and export upstreamness measures. Panel B drops mineral products (HS codes: 25-27), 
while Panel C drops HS codes categorized as capital goods (under the UN BEC Rev 4), from the calculation of the weighted-average upstreamness measures. For ease 
of comparison, Panels A-C adopt the same vertical scale as Figure 1A in the main paper. Panel D uses industry upstreamness measures based on the US 2002 Input-
Output Tables (from Antràs et al. 2012), in lieu of the Chinese 2007 Input-Output Tables.  
Appendix Figure 2 




Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Intermediary status is deduced from 
firm names following a keyword search algorithm.  
 
 
Appendix Figure 3 




Notes: Authors’ own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Kernel density plots of the difference 
between import and export upstreamness at the firm level. The sample comprises 6,982 “survivor” firms that export 
and import in 2000 and in 2014, and 91,465 “new” two-way traders that reported export and import activity in 2014 
but not in 2000. 
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